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Despite considerable interest in the relationship between Islam and political violence, there is 
little systematic empirical research that explores the intra-state conflict proneness of Muslim-
majority states. Existing studies either offer inconclusive evidence of a relationship or suffer 
from methodological flaws. If we analyze the proportion of countries with large Muslim 
populations that experience domestic armed conflicts, Muslim-majority states do in fact stand 
out. What explains the prevalence of political violence in the Muslim world and to what extent 
does religion play a role in promoting violence? Under which conditions ethno-political 
organizations opt for violent strategies to achieve their political goals? Under which conditions 
Islamist parties denounce violence and shift from radical to moderate, pragmatist positions? 
These questions are yet to be fully addressed. In an attempt to fill a gap in the extant literature, 
this dissertation investigates the empirical nexus between Islam and political 
violence/nonviolence by specifically focusing on the incidence of domestic armed conflict, 
group-level political violence (such as insurgency, terrorism, and genocide), and party 
moderation. I explore the role of religion and Islamist ideology in driving political violence in 
the first two quantitative chapters whereas the qualitative chapter focuses on Islamist party 
moderation. I argue that religion alone does not necessarily make countries more or less conflict-
prone. Socio-economic and political conditions usually determine the decision to resort to 
violence or alternatively to renounce violence and to moderate. Higher prevalence of repressive 
regimes, poverty, and youth bulges make Muslim-plurality countries very vulnerable to domestic 
conflict. The overall findings indicate that, contrary to suggestions and claims in the literature, 
neither religious fractionalization nor Islam promotes political violence once socio-economic and 




involved in domestic armed conflict, but these states are also characterized by lower GDP per 
capita, oil dependency, state repression, autocracy, and youth bulges, all of which correlate 
strongly with domestic armed conflict. Moreover, the analysis of Islamist parties suggest that 
Islamist parties respond to societal changes, renounce violence and moderate their radical 
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In December 2010, a Tunisian vegetable peddler burned himself to death as a protest after his 
cart is taken away by police. This incident created a spillover effect of violent and nonviolent 
protests in many Middle Eastern countries, and initiated the Arab Spring. So far, the Arab Spring 
successfully toppled dictators in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya while the protests in Syria 
transformed into a bloody civil war. Both academicians and policy makers are wondering about 
the causes of these ongoing protests and the cycle of violence in the Middle East. In fact, it is not 
uncommon to see politically oriented violence in the Middle East, as well as in other parts of the 
Muslim world.  
While some scholars argue that unfavorable socio-economic and political conditions such 
as state repression, income inequality, and unemployment are driving violence in the Muslim 
world, others emphasize the influence of religion in fostering violence (Dalacoura 2011; Fish et 
al. 2010; Hafez 2003; Huntington 1996; Toft 2007; Zaidise et al 2007). Not surprisingly, since 
9/11, Islam is used as an explanatory concept for many issues involving Muslims. More 
specifically, even among scholars, there is the tendency to refer to Islamic culture to explain 
many failures in the Muslim world without proper research (Roy 2004). Yet, the Muslim world 
is very diverse; there is no unique Islam and the understanding/practice of Islam differs 
considerably from one region to another. For example, while many mainstream religious leaders 
and Muslims contend that those who kill civilians in the name of Islam are not Muslims, some 
militant groups with an “Islamist” ideology argue the opposite; they believe that those who 
denounce the physical struggle against nonbelievers are not Muslims (Vertigans 2009). What 
explains the prevalence of political violence in the Muslim world? To what extent does religion 




increased especially after 9/11 terrorist attacks, these questions remain underexplored and 
existing studies suffer from oversimplification or methodological flaws.   
Some scholars argue that religious fundamentalism and/or political Islam is a reaction to 
modernity; the goal is protection of religious identity from modernity and secularism (Ayoob 
2005; Fox 2004). Modern social scientists such as Karl Marx, John Stuart Mill, and Max Weber, 
predicted that modernity would lead to the institutional separation of religious and secular 
spheres as well as the marginalization and decline of religion (Appleby 2000). Contrary to the 
expectations of modernization and secularization theory, the portion of the world population 
adhering to Christianity, Islam and Hinduism increased from fifty percent in 1900 to sixty-four 
percent in 2000 (Toft et al 2011:2). In-line with this trend, the influence of religion on politics 
has also increased (Armstrong 2009; Berger 1999; Fox 2007; Philpott 2007). Toft et al. note that 
“Once passive, religion is now assertive and engaged. Once local, it is now global. Once 
subservient to the powers that be, religion has often become prophetic and resistant to politicians 
at every level” (2011:3). Ironically, the resurgence of religion is facilitated by the dynamics of 
modernization (which predicted the demise of religion) such as democracy, technological 
improvements in communication, and globalization. The crises in secular ideologies also 
contributed to this religious resurgence (Toft et al 2011).1  
The religious resurgence that we have witnessed since the 1960s has led to the increasing 
impact of religion in politics. In many parts of the world, religious institutions have prominent 
public roles and the public-private distinction is blurred (Appleby 2000). The increasing 
influence of religion on politics is also manifested in wars. Civil wars driven by religious 
differences have increased over time as they are often cited to be more destructive, more likely to 
                                                 
1 Many secular governments have failed to provide prosperity and stability in the developing countries. As a result, 




recur, and longer lasting compared with non-religious civil wars (Toft 2007). In 2010, 50% of 
sixteen ongoing civil wars had a religious basis (Toft et al. 2011).  
Religion has the potential to promote conflict by influencing the identity, loyalty and 
political goals of people. However, religious goals and identities often mix with non-religious 
goals in many conflicts (Philpott 2007). Religious cleavages are not clearly distinguishable from 
ethnic grievances in some cases and, therefore, may not be the root cause of many supposedly 
religious domestic armed conflicts (Appleby 2000; Philpott 2007). For example, Appleby points 
out that the exact role of religion in the Bosnian war (1992-1995) is not clear. Even though 
religious symbols were clearly utilized, some analysts point out that the most Bosnian Muslims 
were secularized and only a few Serb or Croat nationalist leaders were practicing Catholicism or 
Orthodoxy. For instance, according to Paul Mojzes, a religious historian, the Bosnian war was 
primarily ethno-national, not religious (Appleby 2000: 67-68). Similarly, it is not exactly clear 
whether the Chechen fighters in Russia and the Palestinians (e.g., Hamas in Gaza) are motivated 
by religion or nationalism. 
Some scholars (Fox 2007; Toft et al. 2011) criticize the tendency on the part of 
international relations scholarship to underestimate the impact of religion by emphasizing social 
and economic causes, whereas other scholars (Canetti et al. 2010; Fish et al. 2010; Sorli et al. 
2005) are more skeptical about the impact of religion. Toft et al. argue that ‘religion is a basic 
driver of politics in its own right’ (2011:219). On the other hand, Canetti et al. (2010) and 
Zaidise et al. (2007) argue that socio-economic deprivation plays a mediating role between 
political violence and religion. As Coward and Smith (2004) point out, religious texts and 
practices are open to interpretation. Therefore, the interpretation or manipulation of religion by 




and peace. Moreover, improvements in cross-cultural communication caused religious 
polycentrism. Therefore, seemingly religious behaviors cannot be explained by religious 
affiliation alone.  
Extremists, who argue that they uphold the fundamentals of religion, are highly selective 
in choosing religious doctrines to justify violence. Thus, they convince uneducated ordinary 
believers by using selective religious scriptures, which seemingly endorse violence (Appleby 
2000). While there are instances when Islamic groups tend to shift from radical to moderate 
positions, or vice versa, there is little evidence that these shifts in strategies stem from religious 
teachings. For example, the concept of “Jihad” can be used both to justify violence and peaceful 
activities since it is interpreted differently by different Muslims. Classical Islamic scholars point 
out two primary types of jihad: the greater jihad and the lesser jihad. The first one refers to the 
spiritual struggle to be a morally better person by fighting off immoral desires, whereas the latter 
one, which is only a means to achieve the greater jihad, refers to a physical struggle permitted 
under certain conditions such as self-defense or oppression. Yet, contemporary radical Islamist 
groups redefined jihad as an individual duty for all Muslims to fight against non-Muslims as well 
as some seemingly “Muslim” leaders. So, any person who does not follow Islam and who 
prevents “the realization of Islam” becomes a legitimate target of jihad (Mandaville 2006).  
Among all religions, Islam is the most commonly associated with political violence.2 It is 
argued that Islam is intolerant towards nonbelievers and hence, it is inherently conflict-prone.  
The scholars who refer to Islamic culture to explain prevalence of domestic and inter-state 
conflict in the Muslim world rely on the concept of jihad, some selective historical cases, and 
selective verses from the Koran (Laquer 2003; Pipes 2003; Toft 2007). For instance, Huntington 
(1996) argues that “Islam has bloody borders and bloody innards”. Yet, numerous quantitative 
                                                 




studies have tested Huntington’s (1996) famous “clash of civilizations” thesis and found little or 
no empirical support.3 Similarly, some scholars claim that Islam encourages the use of violence 
against non-Muslims since the obligation of jihad calls for a fight against nonbelievers (Laquer 
2003). All in all, even though these scholars do not necessarily explore the causal factors that 
lead to Muslim-majority states’ disproportionate involvement in intra-state conflicts, they still 
characterize Muslim-majority countries as more violence/conflict prone in general.  
However, Muslims historically have been mostly peaceful and tolerant. Just two decades 
ago, religious ideologies in the Middle East were not popular at all and suicide terror in the name 
of jihad was very rare (Mousseau 2011). Moreover, socio-economic and political grievances may 
be the root cause of seemingly religiously oriented violence. For example, public opinion 
surveys show that those who think 9/11 terrorist attacks are justified are not Islamists at all and 
most radical Muslims have a Western education, not a religious one (Kurzman 2011; Roy 2004). 
According to a survey conducted in 2001, seventy five percent of Muslims believe that the US 
foreign policy was partly responsible for the 9/11 attacks (Kurzman 2011). Similarly, Roy 
(2004:46) notes that “Al Qaeda did not attack Saint Peter’s Basilica in Rome but the World 
Trade Center; it targeted modern imperialism”.  
To sum up, while theoretical debates about the role of Islam in promoting conflict are 
abundant, there are only a handful of empirical studies. The existing studies provide mixed 
evidence regarding Islam’s role in promoting conflict (Fish et al 2010; Fox 2007; Sorli et al 2005; 
Toft e al 2011). There is no scholarly consensus about the extent to which religion in general and 
the Islamic faith in particular, may foster violence. Does religion have an independent effect on 
conflicts regardless of socio-economic conditions or does it act as a catalyst under certain 
                                                 
3 Many studies have challenged Huntington’s thesis. For a comprehensive list of quantitative studies testing 




circumstances? Under what conditions do ethno-political organizations resort to violence? Are 
religious organizations more violence-prone than others? Under what conditions do Islamist 
parties renounce the use of violent means and ideologically and behaviorally moderate? These 
questions are yet to be addressed systematically.  
The purpose of this dissertation is to contribute to these literatures by investigating the 
empirical nexus between Islam and political violence/nonviolence. This dissertation will 
specifically focus on the incidence of domestic armed conflict, group-level political violence 
(such as insurgency, terrorism, and genocide), and party moderation. The benefits of this 
research are threefold. First, it sheds light on the complex relationship between Islam and 
political violence through a more systematic, theoretically oriented and empirical analysis that 
better controls for alternative explanations for political violence. Second, understanding the 
factors that make ethno-political organizations prefer violent strategies over non-violent ones has 
significant policy implications. The findings of this research are likely to inform policy makers 
and assist them in developing strategies that help to reduce the threat of religious radicalism. 
Third, understanding the evolution of radical Islamist parties (the moderation process) is 
necessary for better policymaking especially in the wake of the “Arab Spring.” Islamist parties 
are key political actors in the Middle East and their degree of commitment to liberal democratic 
principles as well as the moderation process will be very influential during the democratic 
transitions in the region. 
Chapter Outline 
In chapter 2, I examine factors that increase a country’s risk of experiencing domestic 
armed conflicts and I empirically test competing arguments proposed by scholars to explain 




explained by a number of competing arguments that rely on either case studies or mere 
descriptive statistics. In this chapter, I first review the literature on Islam and political violence, 
and domestic armed conflict, respectively. Second, I compare the prevalence of domestic armed 
conflicts and some socio-economic indicators in Muslim-plurality countries to other countries by 
using descriptive statistics. Then, I develop a general domestic armed conflict onset model and 
conduct logistic regression analysis to test my hypotheses. I argue that the higher prevalence of 
repressive regimes, poverty, and youth bulges in the Islamic world make Muslim-plurality 
countries very vulnerable to domestic armed conflict. I utilize the Uppsala Conflict Data 
Program’s recent data for the 1981-2009 period to test my hypotheses. The empirical findings 
show that Muslim-plurality states are indeed disproportionally involved in domestic armed 
conflicts, but these states are also characterized by lower GDP per capita, oil dependency, state 
repression, autocracy, and youth bulges, all of which correlate strongly with domestic armed 
conflict. The significance of Islam disappears when controls for such factors are included in the 
statistical model.  
In chapter 3, I conduct a group-level analysis and explore conditions under which ethno-
political organizations prefer violent strategies to achieve their goals. This chapter builds on the 
previous chapter by focusing on factors that increase the probability of the use of violence at the 
group-level rather than country-level. The review of the literature suggests that ethno-political 
organizations’ decision to use violence is influenced by the existence of grievances, political 
opportunity structures, resource mobilization, organizational structure, and the ideology of the 
organization. In addition to these commonly cited factors, I argue that the existence of youth 
bulges in a society also increase the probability of adopting violent strategies by ethno-political 




likely recruits for violent organizations. I use the Minorities at Risk Organizational Behavior 
(MAROB) dataset, which includes 118 organizations in 16 countries of the Middle East and 
North Africa to test my hypotheses. Even though the level of analysis and also degree of 
violence differs from the previous chapter, the findings suggest that similar causal factors that 
promote domestic armed conflict such as socio-economic grievances, existence of repressive 
states, and youth bulges also increase the probability of use of violent strategies by ethno-
political organizations. Ethno-political organizations that have a religious/ Islamist ideology are 
no more conflict-prone than other organizations. These findings are consistent with the findings 
of the previous chapter; socio-economic factors and political opportunities/constraints rather than 
religion drives the decision to resort to violence.  Some scholars argue that youth have played a 
significant role during the recent uprisings in the Middle East. Those young people, dissatisfied 
with their oppressive regimes and frustrated with unemployment, rebelled against their 
governments (Hoffman and Jamal 2012; Mohammed 2011). The findings of this chapter support 
the argument that the existence of youth bulges in the Middle East increases the probability of 
resorting to violence. 
In chapter 4, I examine causal factors that contribute to moderation of Islamist parties.  
While exploring the conditions which foster political violence and radicalism is an interesting 
and important research question, the process of de-radicalization and moderation of Islamist 
parties is equally important, which remains underexplored. In this respect, exploring the 
evolution of radical Islamist parties (moderation process) will yield important clues to better 
understand democratization in the Muslim world and formulate more cohesive policies in the 
wake of the “Arab Awakening.” Shifting from radical to moderate positions has been a common 




and others—as to what the notion of moderation refers. Moderation, hence, has become a catch-
all term.  What forms does Islamist moderation take, and which factors underlie each form of 
moderation? Although a prevalent question in recent years, less is known about the causes and 
forms of Islamist moderation in a systematic fashion. By building on the findings of the 
Communist moderation literature, I introduce a two-stage framework to explain variation in 
Islamist moderation over time and across space: tactical vs. ideological moderation. Tactical 
moderation refers to the kind of moderation where radical parties leave armed struggle and 
decide to accept electoral democracy as a means to achieve ideological goals without 
compromising their platforms. Structural factors such as political liberalization, international 
factors and state repression are causes of tactical moderation. Ideological moderation pertains to 
shifts in platform from a radical niche to more moderate lines to respond to societal changes 
(economic liberalization, economic growth, electoral loss and changing voter preferences) to 
gain greater popular support. Empirically, the Italian Communist Party and the Party for Justice 
and Development in Morocco are analyzed in a comparative perspective.  
Finally, chapter 5 summarizes the key findings and contributions of this dissertation to 
the social science literature. I also discuss potential policy implications and provide final remarks 
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 The Puzzling Case of “Islamic Violence”: What Explains Prevalence of 
























Despite considerable interest in the relationship between Islam and political violence, 
there is little systematic empirical research that explores the intra-state conflict 
proneness of countries with large Muslim populations. The studies that do exist either 
offer inconclusive evidence of a relationship or suffer from methodological flaws that 
bring into question their very findings. If we analyze the proportion of countries with 
large Muslim populations that experience domestic armed conflicts, Muslim-majority 
states do in fact stand out. How can we explain this high hazard of intra-state conflict 
among countries with large Muslim populations? To what extent, if at all, Islamic faith 
is a contributing factor to this phenomenon? Indeed, might there be potentially 
overlooked socio-economic or political characteristics that explain the seeming 
association between Islam and intra-state conflict? These questions have yet to be fully 
addressed. In an attempt to fill a gap in the extant literature, this chapter investigates the 
empirical nexus between Islam and domestic armed conflict through the conditional 
factors of relative deprivation and opportunity structures. I argue that higher prevalence 
of repressive regimes, poverty, and youth bulges make Muslim-plurality countries very 
vulnerable to domestic armed conflicts. Further, the role of state repression is examined 
in relation to domestic armed conflict onset, which has largely been ignored in existing 
research. Utilizing  Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s recent data for the 1981-2009 
period, the findings indicate that Muslim-plurality states are indeed disproportionately 
involved in domestic armed conflicts, but these states are also characterized by lower 
GDP per capita, oil dependency, state repression, autocracy, and youth bulges, all of 
which correlate strongly with domestic armed conflict onset. The significance of Islam 
disappears when controls for such factors are included in the statistical model. Among 
the factors that increase the risk of domestic armed conflict, the presence of a youth 














Not surprisingly, the tragic events of 9/11 led to growing interest in the topic of religion and 
violence for the common audience and for scholars alike. As the terrorists were self-declared 
jihadists, it was also no surprise that Islam became very closely associated with political violence. 
While it is true that a large proportion of terrorist attacks during recent decades have been 
committed by Muslims in the name of Islam (Fish et al 2010), some scholars blame the Western 
media for an exaggerated and undue association of Islam and violence (Ahmed 2011; Said 1997). 
A prominent instance is the bombing of the Federal Office building in Oklahoma City in 1995 
and its initial attribution to Muslims (Ahmed 2011). Similarly, when Anders Behring Breivik 
killed 76 civilians in Norway in 2011, some media outlets in the US rushed to blame Muslims. 
The New York Times featured a headline: “Powerful Explosions Hit Oslo; Jihadis Claim 
Responsibility.” Interestingly, the killer was initially labeled a terrorist; once the media 
discovered that the attack was committed by a right wing Norwegian, he was described as a 
“madman” or simply as “insane.” 4 
Besides the media, many scholars either implicitly or explicitly argue that the Islamic 
faith is particularly conflict-prone (Ben-Dor and Pedahzur 2003; Huntington 1993; 1996; Lewis 
2001; 2003; Pipes 2003; Toft 2007). For example, Huntington (1996) argues that “Islam has 
bloody borders and bloody innards”. Huntington contends that future conflicts in the world will 
be between different civilizations, especially between the Islamic and Western civilizations. 
However, Huntington’s thesis relies on a selective reading of history. Numerous quantitative 
studies have tested Huntington’s conjectures and found little or no empirical support.5 Historian 
Bernard Lewis (1990:8) states that “It should by now be clear that we are facing a mood and a 
                                                 
4 “When it is easy to blame Muslims”, Today’s Zaman, July 27 2011; Dr. Abdullahi Sheikh Rashid. 
5 Many studies have challenged Huntington’s thesis. For a comprehensive list of quantitative studies testing 




movement far transcending the level of issues and policies and the governments that pursue them. 
This is no less than a clash of civilizations—the perhaps irrational but surely historic reaction of 
an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present, and the worldwide 
expansion of both.”  There is also some evidence that Muslim majority states are more likely to 
engage in domestic conflicts than other states (Fox 2007; Toft 2007). On the other hand, some 
scholars criticize the tendency to stereotype the Islamic faith as violence-prone and refer to the 
diversity within the Muslim world and suggest that other socio-economic factors explain the 
seeming conflict-proneness of Muslim countries (Ahmad 2011; Esposito 1992; Hafez 2003; 
Zaidise et al 2007). 
 While theoretical debates about the role of Islam in promoting conflict are abundant, as 
Fish et al. (2010) and Fox (2004) note, there are only a handful of systematic empirical studies. 
The extant research on the relationship between Islam and violence largely relies on case studies, 
which prevents making broad generalizations (Fish 2011). Further, the existing studies provide 
mixed evidence regarding Islam’s role in promoting domestic conflict (Fish et al 2010; Fox 2007; 
Sorli et al 2005; Toft et al 2011). While religion can incite conflict by influencing the identity, 
loyalty, and political goals of people, religious ends and identities mix with non-religious goals 
in many conflicts (Philpott 2007). This chapter argues that Islam alone does not necessarily make 
countries more or less conflict-prone. Indeed, existing studies that conclude that Muslim-
majority countries are characterized by a higher rate of domestic armed conflict and political 
violence fail to control for factors that increase the risk of conflict, such as socio-economic 
development, state repression, and oil dependence, and confound many variables under “Islam”. 





This chapter focuses on the onset of domestic armed conflict and contributes to the 
research on Islam and political violence by examining the causal factors that explain variation in 
the prevalence of domestic armed conflict in Muslim-plurality states 6 . I argue that higher 
prevalence of repressive regimes, youth bulge, and oil dependent economies, all of which highly 
correlate with domestic armed conflict onset, make Muslim-plurality countries particularly 
vulnerable to intra-state conflicts. In other words, Muslim-plurality states should be no more 
conflict prone than others once we control for the correlates of domestic armed conflict.  This 
chapter also contributes to the literature on domestic armed conflict by exploring the role of state 
repression (which has largely been overlooked) in increasing the risk of domestic armed conflict.  
This chapter is organized into five sections. First, I review the literature on Islam and 
political violence, and domestic armed conflict onset respectively. Next, I discuss my theory and 
hypotheses. Then, I summarize data, methods, and my research design, which will be used to test 
the derived hypotheses. I discuss empirical findings in the fourth section. Lastly, implications of 
these findings and some suggestions for future research are provided in the concluding section.  
C. Islam and Political Violence  
Despite historical evidence to the contrary, Islam is commonly associated with violence and 
terrorism by the US media and some scholars. Muslims have historically been mostly peaceful 
and tolerant. Just two decades ago, secular and nationalist ideologies were far more popular than 
religious ones in the Middle East and suicide terror in the name of jihad was very rare (Mousseau 
2011). Yet, some scholars argue that the core principles of Islam include intolerant views toward 
nonbelievers and that Islam is inherently violence-prone.  The scholars who attribute conflict 
proneness of Muslims to Islam largely rely on the concept of jihad and some selective verses 
from the Koran to support their arguments (Laquer 2003; Pipes 2003; Toft 2007). For instance, 
                                                 




Laquer (2003) argues that violence is blessed in Islam if it is carried out against infidels 
(nonbelievers) and there is no room for them in the Islamic faith. Similarly, Pipes (2003) claims 
that the violence-proneness of Muslims stems from the very nature of Islam: the obligation of 
jihad. Jihad is an Arabic word which literally means “struggle” and it is translated as “holy war” 
by Pipes.  
However, this highly controversial concept of “Jihad” can be interpreted in different 
ways; a small minority of fundamentalist Muslims think jihad justifies physical violence against 
“infidels” whereas the vast majority regard it as an internal struggle to be a morally better person 
(e.g., by fighting off immoral desires). Roy (2004) notes that jihadist Islam is a product of 
sociological changes. Traditionally, jihad was understood as a collective, defensive duty, but 
modern radicals view it as an individual permanent duty to fight against the West. Islam is also 
portrayed as a totalitarian and politically oriented religion (Zaidise et al 2007). Islam has not 
undergone a reformation like Christianity, which separated the religious and political spheres; 
religiously oriented violence is attributed to the lack of secular state systems in the Muslim world 
(Appleby 2000; Toft 2007).  
Toft (2007) argues that in Abrahamic traditions violent conflict is regarded as a 
manifestation of God’s will. These traditions tend to be uncompromising and encourage people 
to sacrifice in this world (for eternal reward in the afterlife) to defend their faith.  Thus, the 
indivisibility of religious doctrines and the promise of martyrdom render bargaining and 
deterrence useless. Radical Islamic groups promise spiritual incentives (paradise) to individuals; 
therefore, high-cost activities in the present life become rational since the future benefits exceed 
the costs (Wiktorowicz and Kaltenthaler 2006).  All in all, even though these scholars do not 




conflicts, they generally characterize Muslim-majority countries as more violence/conflict-prone 
and attribute this to Islam. However, the Muslim world is very diverse; there is no unique Islam 
practiced by all Muslims in the world. These cleavages within Islam prevent to treat Islam as a 
single monolithic entity and draw a conclusion regarding Islam’s role in promoting conflict. 
Extremists, who refer to some selective religious doctrines to justify use of violence, exist in all 
religions.  
As mentioned above, there are only a few empirical studies that examine the link between 
Islam and domestic armed conflict. Sorli et. al (2005) observe that Islam is not a significant 
factor in driving civil war once they control for other explanatory factors such as economic 
development, oil dependency, ethnic diversity etc. Similarly, Fish et al. (2010) examine Islam’s 
conflict proneness by analyzing episodes of large scale political violence that occurred during 
1946-2007. They observe that there is no significant correlation between the Muslim proportion 
living in a country and the number of deaths in political violence episodes. The authors also 
examine whether radical Islamism as an ideology, rather than the Islamic faith, is associated with 
political violence. They rely on press reports and secondary sources to code conflicts instigated 
by Islamists. The findings indicate that Islamist ideology is involved in eleven percent of total 
episodes and accounted for sixteen percent of total deaths. Even though one may conclude that 
the episodes involving Islamists seem to account for a disproportionate amount of deaths, Fish et 
al. note that some episodes were instigated by both Islamist and other actors who bear joint 
responsibility. 
On the other hand, Toft (2007) finds that in forty-two religious civil wars from 1940 to 
2000, eighty one percent had either incumbent governments or rebels identified with Islam. In 




overrepresentation in civil wars with historical (lack of Thirty Years’ War and the Peace of 
Westphalia in Islam), geographic (proximity of Israel, oil reserves, and Islam’s holiest sites), and 
particularly ideological (jihad) factors. Toft notes that the destructiveness of the Thirty Years’ 
War and the following Enlightenment period decreased the power of religious authorities and 
resulted in the development of the modern secular state system in Europe. In contrast, the Islamic 
world has not experienced its own Thirty Years’ War, which may have enabled a continued role 
of religion in politics. The geographic proximity of oil reserves and Islam’s holiest sites, Western 
industrial states’ interest in the Middle East, and colonial experience also contributed to the rise 
of Islamic identity and radicalization. Lastly, Toft emphasizes the concept of jihad to explain the 
prevalence of civil wars in the Muslim world and argues that violence is justified in Islam to 
defend the faith from unbelievers. Toft provides some historical examples to support her 
argument, such as Muslim fighters who arrived from Iran, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia to help the 
Afghan mujahedeen combat Soviet invasion in 1979.   
However, Toft’s (2007) findings suffer from several methodological weaknesses. First, 
Toft bases her conclusions on mere descriptive statistics, which prevents drawing any inferences 
about the drivers of civil war. Second, the author does not attempt to address the possibility of 
spurious relationships through the use of a multivariate statistical model. Toft only looks at mere 
percentages of civil wars in which Islam is somehow involved. Also, Toft provides insufficient 
information about the coding of religious civil wars, particularly those that are associated with 
Islam. Toft (2007:112-113) provides detailed information about the criteria to be coded as a civil 
war but does not provide any explanation about the coding of “religious civil wars” or civil wars 
in which Islam is involved. For example, Toft states that “of the forty two  religious civil wars 




thirty four of the civil wars had an Islamic component” (2007:113). Toft does not explain what 
exactly “adherence to Islam” or “Islamic component” means.  
In a recent study, Fox (2007) tests Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” thesis and finds 
partial support for Huntington’s argument about Islam’s conflict-proneness. Fox uses the State 
Failure dataset to operationalize domestic conflicts between 1960 and 2004. Fox examines both 
intra-religious and inter-religious conflicts in which at least one party invokes religion. Fox 
(2007) finds that, while the Islamic civilization is found to be more conflict-prone, the majority 
of conflicts involving Islamic countries is with other Muslim-majority states (not with other 
civilizations). Fox also observes that beginning in 2002, religious conflicts became a majority of 
all conflicts. However, Fox’s study suffers from oversimplification and failure to control for war 
onset factors. Fox relies on comparative analysis of proportion of state failures in Muslim-
majority and other countries. 
In sum, there is some evidence that domestic armed conflicts are more common among 
Muslim-majority states compared to other countries. Yet, it is not possible to draw a causal 
relationship between Islam and the risk of domestic conflict without controlling for the correlates 
of domestic armed conflict. Muslim-majority states’ domestic conflict-proneness is explained by 
a number of competing arguments that rely on either case studies or mere descriptive statistics. I 
argue that a more systematic analysis is necessary to investigate other potential explanatory 
factors that account for Muslim majority states’ involvement in intra-state conflicts. Below, I 
review the literature on domestic armed conflict onset which may help to explain the 






Correlates of Domestic Armed Conflict  
There are numerous quantitative studies that examine factors that increase the risk of domestic 
armed conflict. Even though different scholars use different sets of variables and sometimes 
disagree on how to operationalize similar concepts or provide different interpretations of similar 
findings, at least some factors are found to be robustly correlated with domestic armed conflict 
onset. Economic factors, the resource curse, demography, geographic and environmental factors, 
ethnic and religious diversity, conflict history, government type and regime change are among 
the commonly tested concepts which are deemed to impact risk of domestic conflict (Dixon 
2009). Among hundreds of variables used to proxy some of the concepts mentioned above, 
population, GDP per capita, economic growth, democracy, political instability, small military 
capacity, rough terrain, war-prone neighbors, and oil dependence are found to be significantly 
correlated to domestic armed conflict and robust to sensitivity checks (Dixon 2009; Hegre and 
Sambanis 2006).  
Economic factors, which are generally operationalized by GDP per capita or annual GDP 
per capita growth rate, are among the few variables which are robustly correlated with domestic 
armed conflict onset. Yet, GDP per capita is a very broad concept which can be interpreted in 
different ways. For example, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) use GDP per capita to measure the 
opportunity cost of rebellion, whereas Fearon and Laitin (2003) use the same variable to measure 
state capacity. Indeed, it is reasonable to assume that countries with low GDP per capita would 
be characterized by low state capacities or low opportunity cost of rebellion. Regardless of the 
way economic factors are interpreted, it is safe to conclude that poor countries are more prone to 




Oil-dependence, or natural resource dependence, is another economic factor which 
increases the risk of domestic armed conflict. Oil rents make leaders less dependent on tax 
revenues, which create weak state institutions. Weak institutions in turn increase the feasibility 
of rebellion (Fjelde 2009). Fearon (2005) argues that oil producers generally have low state 
capabilities, and therefore are more prone to conflict, whereas Ross (2006) claims that oil and 
other minerals increase the risk of conflict because they make independence more desirable for 
resource-rich regions. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) confirm that the existence of natural resources 
creates opportunities to rebel. Natural resource dependent economies may also make countries 
more conflict prone by increasing the probability of trade shocks (Humphreys 2005). On the 
other hand, oil money can also be used to co-opt potential dissidents, especially in politically 
corrupt regimes, thus reducing the risk of domestic conflict (Fjelde 2009). Hegre and Sambanis 
(2006)’s sensitivity analysis suggests that oil dependence is marginally robust whereas natural 
resource dependence is not robust. The relative robustness of oil dependence compared to natural 
resource dependence is a theoretical puzzle that can be explored by future studies. One potential 
reason could be missing data and measurement errors. Ross (2006:265) notes that the studies that 
examine the link between natural resource wealth and civil war suffer from measurement error, 
endogeneity problems, lack of robustness, shortage of data, and uncertainty about causal 
mechanisms.  
The demographic and geographic characteristics of a country also affect the likelihood of 
domestic armed conflict; conditions that favor insurgency, such as total population, youth bulges, 
and mountainous terrain make countries more conflict-prone. It is hard to control people and 
deter insurgency in highly populated countries. Indeed, population is one of the variables that 




mountainous terrain makes it easier for rebel groups to hide from government and it is robust to 
sensitivity analyses (Hegre and Sambanis 2006).  The existence of a youth bulge also increases 
the risk of domestic conflict. There is historical evidence that violent outbreaks are correlated 
with the proportion of a society’s young male population. Young people tend to be more 
violence-prone compared with adults, because they tend to be more risk-acceptant and they are 
not fully aware of the consequences of their actions and (Fuller 2003). The existence of a youth 
bulge increases both grievances (especially when coupled with poverty, unemployment, and 
repressive regimes) and the supply of potential rebel recruits (Urdal 2006).  
The role of ethnic or religious diversity in promoting domestic conflict is debated by 
many scholars. Theoretically, ethnic and religious differences are likely to be sources of 
grievances and therefore increase the risk of intra-state conflict. Empirically, existing studies 
provide contradictory findings. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) find that greater social 
fractionalization (both ethnic and religious) actually reduces the risk of conflict. Hegre and 
Sambanis (2006) show that ethnic fractionalization is robustly associated with the risk of 
domestic conflicts, in which 25 battle deaths is used as a threshold to code conflicts, whereas it is 
insignificant in civil wars which has at least 1.000 battle deaths. As far as religious diversity is 
concerned, the findings are again inconclusive. De Soysa (2002) finds that religious homogeneity 
increases the risk of civil war whereas religious heterogeneity decreases it. On the other hand, 
Reynal-Querol’s (2002) analysis of ethnic civil wars indicates that religious polarization 
increases the risk of ethnic conflicts. Lastly, Fearon and Latin (2003) find no significant 
relationship between civil war and religious fractionalization between 1945 and 1999.  
Regime type is another important factor which affects the risk of domestic armed conflict. 




insufficient repressiveness to deter violence and insufficient openness to induce substitution to 
nonviolent tactics (Hegre at al 2001). Both Hegre and Sambanis (2006) and Dixon’s (2009) 
analyses confirm that anocracy and institutional inconsistency (change in polity score prior to the 
civil war) are robustly associated with the risk of civil war.  
Finally, more recent studies explore some new concepts which are ignored in the 
previous research, such as state repression (Jakobsen and De Soysa 2009; Young 2012), different 
dimensions of state capacity (Fjelde and  Soysa 2009; Gleditsch and Ruggeri 2010), political 
corruption (Fjelde 2009) or focus on developing better measures of existing concepts. Gleditsch 
and Ruggeri (2010) argue that Polity scores or GDP per capita are poor indicators of state 
strength and offer an alternative variable: irregular leader changes, which occur through a 
military coup or violent takeover of the government, to measure state weakness. The authors find 
that irregular regime transitions indeed increase the risk of domestic conflict. Fjelde and Soysa 
(2009) examine impact of state capacity and categorize state capacity into three types: coercion, 
co-optation, and cooperation. Their findings indicate that high government spending (co-optation) 
and trustworthy institutions (cooperation) can better reduce the risk of conflict than coercive 
state capacities. Jakobsen and De Soysa (2009) find that state repression in ethnically 
fractionalized states negatively affects the likelihood of civil war, whereas it increases the risk of 
domestic conflict in ethnically homogenous states. Young (2012) finds that poor and repressive 
regimes are particularly more prone to conflict. Fjelde (2009) finds that while both oil and 
corruption alone increase the risk of civil war, the interaction of oil and political corruption 
actually decreases the risk of civil war, which suggests that oil dependency can play a pacifying 




In sum, the literature on domestic armed conflict onset suggests that there are numerous 
factors which have the potential to increase the risk of domestic conflicts and there is no “right” 
set of variables which should be included in a domestic armed conflict onset model. Nevertheless, 
thanks to the development of more sophisticated statistical models and new data collection, 
considerable progress has been made in understanding the causes and correlates of domestic 
armed conflict.  
Returning to the relationship between Islam and intra-state conflict, how do these 
potential factors that increase the risk of domestic conflict operate in the Muslim world and to 
what extent are these factors seen among Muslim-plurality countries? Also, can we explain the 
prevalence of domestic conflict with these commonly cited correlates of domestic armed conflict 
or is there another causal mechanism that might be driving insurgency in the Muslim world? In 
other words, is there an “Islamic exceptionalism”? These questions still remain underexplored. A 
more systematic and empirical analysis is required to examine the relationship between Islam 
and the risk of intra-state conflict. To do so, I rely on another body of literature that focuses on 
the underlying causes of radicalization and violence in the Muslim world. In the next section, I 
review the literature on radicalization and violence in the Muslim world and synthesize it with 
the domestic armed conflict onset literature from which I derive my testable hypotheses.  
D. Theory and Hypothesis 
Most of the research about Islamic activism is either descriptive or focuses on the unique 
ideological orientation of Islam and thus perpetuates “Islamic exceptionalism” (Wiktorowicz 
2004). Since 9/11, emphasizing Islamic culture in explaining many failures in the Muslim world 
without proper research and evidence has become a common trend in many fields (Roy 2004). In 




violence in the Muslim world. According to the literature on radicalization and violence in the 
Muslim world, the prevalent causal factors of religious violence can be categorized into cultural 
explanations, relative deprivation, political opportunity structures, existence of rentier states and 
youth bulges. 
According to cultural-identity based explanations, Islamists adhere to radical religious 
identities as a response to cultural imperialism, colonial history, and the growing influence of 
Western culture. These cultural arguments frame Islamic identity as violence-prone and 
emphasize the salience of religious-cultural norms among Muslims (Ashour 2009). It is argued 
that the failure of secular and liberal ideologies in the Muslim world also contributes to the rise 
of Islamic fundamentalism (Appleby 2000; Toft 2007). Yet, identity does not always determine 
political behavior. Surveys show that there is no significant correlation between personal piety 
and political attitudes (Tessler 2003). Tessler and Robbins (2007) find that religious orientations 
do not seem to affect approval of terrorism among people living in Jordan and Algeria. 
Unfortunately, it is hard to operationalize concepts such as radical Islamic identity. Due to 
limitations in data availability, I proxy Islamic identity with the most commonly practiced 
religion practiced in a country and the proportion of Muslims living in a country. I test the 
political culture approach with the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1a: Muslim-plurality states are more likely to have domestic armed conflict 
than non-Muslim states, ceteris paribus. 
Hypothesis 1b:  The risk of domestic armed conflict increases with an increase in the 
proportion of Muslims within a state, ceteris paribus. 
Social, economic, and political grievances and a growing sense of relative deprivation   




2010; Hafez 2003)7. The relative deprivation hypothesis was originally proposed by Tedd Gurr’s 
(1970) theory of conflict behavior. The role of grievances in increasing the risk of domestic 
armed conflicts is also much debated in the literature on civil war. Further, some scholars argue 
that grievances such as high inequality, lack of political rights, ethnic and religious divisions are 
the root causes of civil war, whereas others contend that greed− the existence of an opportunity 
to rebel (e.g., natural resources) − plays a more important role in civil war onset (Collier and 
Hoeffler 2004; Collier et al 2009; De Soysa 2002; Fearon and Laitin 2003). 
Ansari (1984) argues that Islamist militancy is a product of rapid urbanization and rural 
migration. Studies show that militant Islamists tend to come from common backgrounds: 
educated students and professionals in their twenties and thirties, members of the lower middle 
class, recent migrants to cities, unemployed or underemployed. Canetti et al. (2010) also observe 
the relationship between relative deprivation and political violence. The authors use individual 
surveys conducted among Muslims and Jews living in Israel to explore the relationship between 
support for political violence and religious affiliation. Muslims are found to be more supportive 
of political violence in general. However, Jews become more supportive of political violence 
once they control for objective and subjective deprivation by using a structural equation model. 
Although limited in scope, the findings indicate that objective and perceived deprivation 
mediates between religious affiliation and support for political violence. Mousseau (2011) finds 
that approval of Islamist terror is not associated with religiosity, lack of education, poverty or 
income dissatisfaction, but rather with urban poverty. If the relative deprivation hypothesis is 
correct, then, socio-economic grievances should be more prevalent among Muslim-plurality 
states and the risk of domestic conflict should increase with increasing grievances. The above 
discussion leads to one more testable conjecture.  
                                                 




Hypothesis 2: The risk of domestic armed conflict in a state increases with increasing 
socio-economic grievances. 
Hafez (2003) contends that non-militant movements also emerged under unfavorable 
socio-economic conditions and not all Muslim societies experience Muslim rebellion. He argues 
that the Muslim rebel is not the result of economic deprivation or psychological alienation 
produced by failed modernization but a response to indiscriminate state repression and 
institutional exclusion. Hafez criticizes socioeconomic and psychological approaches for 
ignoring the resources required to mobilize and for simplistic assumption that a certain level of 
discontent almost automatically generates rebellion. Moreover, the relative deprivation 
hypothesis ignores the possibility that deprived individuals could also seek reforms by lobbying, 
petitioning, and forming political parties. To rebel, deprived groups should believe that violent 
action is the only option. Therefore, political opportunities play a significant role in transforming 
grievances into militant action. Hafez (2003:19) proposes a “political process approach” to 
Islamist rebellions. This approach considers the political environment in which Islamists operate, 
the mobilization structures by which resources are acquired and allocated, and ideological frames 
with which Islamists justify collective action. It is argued that while exclusive and repressive 
regimes promote violence, inclusive regimes decrease the probability of Islamist violence. 
Hafez’s (2003) political process approach resembles the feasibility hypothesis in the civil war 
onset literature, which focuses on factors that increase the feasibility of rebellion (Collier et al 
2009).  
State repression, which is an important factor in determining the choice of violent or non-
violent strategies by dissidents, has largely been ignored in the civil war onset literature (Young 




On the one hand, repression can increase the cost of collective action and deter rebellion. On the 
other hand, repression can also increase grievances and the risk of conflict. Hafez (2003) argues 
that the timing and nature of repression matters; selective and preemptive repression is likely to 
deter rebellion, whereas indiscriminate repression and institutional exclusion breeds more 
violence. Gupta et al (1993) find that repression breeds both violent and nonviolent protests in 
democracies, whereas there is a curvilinear relationship between repression and 
violent/nonviolent protests in non-democracies. Gurr (1970) also argues that there is a 
curvilinear relationship between repression and rebellion. I expect to find an inverted-U shaped 
relationship between repression and domestic armed conflict. Repression initially increases 
domestic violence since grievances increase with more repression. However, extremely high 
levels of repression should decrease the risk of conflict since the costs of collective action will be 
greater in highly repressive states. 
Hypothesis 3: There is an inverted-U shaped relationship between state repression and 
the probability of domestic armed conflict.    
Going back to the political process approach proposed by Hafez (2003), there are other 
political opportunities and constraints (in addition to state repression) which also affect the 
likelihood of domestic conflict. A higher proportion of young males, which increases the number 
of potential dissidents as well as grievances when coupled with unemployment and poverty, also 
make countries more vulnerable to domestic conflict (Urdal 2006). Finally, rebel groups need 
both financial and human resources to mobilize and to rebel against a government. Oil-dependent 
or natural resource-dependent economies are also associated with a higher risk of domestic 
armed conflict. Indeed, the majority of Muslim states have repressive authoritarian governments, 




unemployment. For example, the Middle East, which is predominantly Muslim, has the highest 
rate of unemployment in the world: 15 million as of 2011. According to a report by the 
International Finance Corporation and Islamic Development Bank, youth (ages 15-24) 
unemployment rate in the Middle East is 25.1 % compared to 12.6 % in the world as of 20108. 
Middle Eastern countries have rich oil supplies as well. Six Gulf countries −Bahrain, Kuwait, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE− sit on nearly 500 billion barrels of crude oil and 41.5 
trillion cubic meters of natural gas reserves (Harrigan and El-Said 2011). The coexistence of all 
of these factors creates a political environment that is very vulnerable to domestic conflict. The 
following hypothesis will test the political process approach: 
Hypothesis 4: The risk of domestic armed conflict increases if there is a rentier state and 
a growing youth population in a state. 
E. Data, Methods, and Research Design 
This section describes the data, methods, and research design that I use to test the hypotheses 
derived in the previous section. I examine causal factors that increase a country’s probability of 
experiencing domestic armed conflict. A time-series cross-sectional dataset, which includes all 
the states in the international system, is used to test the hypotheses above. First, I compare the 
prevalence of domestic armed conflicts and some socio-economic indicators in Muslim-plurality 
countries to other countries by using descriptive statistics. Then, I develop a general domestic 
armed conflict onset model and conduct logistic regression analysis.   
The dependent variable is domestic armed conflict onset and the unit of analysis is the 
country-year. Since reliable data are rarely available during ongoing wars, using conflict onset 
rather than conflict prevalence is preferred. Following Collier and Hoeffler (2004), ongoing 
conflict years are dropped for the purpose of not conflating domestic armed conflict initiation 





and duration. I utilize Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)’s recent data collected by 
Harbom and Wallensteen (2010) and Gleditsch et al (2002) which covers all domestic armed 
conflicts that occurred between 1945 and 2009. The onset dataset contains annual observations 
of 172 states in the international system, as defined by Gleditsch and Ward (1999). Even though 
the data on domestic armed conflict onset are available starting from 1945, it is hard to find 
reliable data about socio-economic indicators before 1980. Data on oil production starts from 
1970 whereas CIRI integrity data, which measure state repression, begin in 1981. Given these 
data limitations, I analyze the period from 1981 to 2009.  
The UCDP/PRIO  conflict data defines an armed conflict as “a contested incompatibility 
which concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, 
of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths” 
(Gledistch et al. 2002: 618).  In total, there are 163 domestic armed conflict onsets out of 4,079 
country-year observations, or 4% of all country-year observations. The working sample consists 
of only about 3.000 country-year observations due to the missing data on several explanatory 
variables.  All 172 countries in the international system are included in the analysis. 
 Independent Variables 
The main explanatory variables included in the analyses below include: Muslim-plurality 
country, Muslim proportion of the total population, GDP per capita, The Cingranelli-Richards 
(CIRI) integrity score, oil rents, natural resource rents, and the proportion of young males (ages 
between 15-24) in a society. The Muslim-plurality variable is a dummy variable which takes the 
value 1 for countries in which Islamic faith is practiced by a plurality of the population. This 
variable comes from Jonathan Fox’s (2004) Religion and State (RAS) project. I also use the 




Islam and political violence. Data on the proportion of Muslims living in a country are taken 
from Kuru (2011). Kuru (2011) collected these demographic data from the International 
Religious Freedom Reports, the CIA World Factbook, and the US Department of State's country 
analysis reports. GDP per capita intends to proxy economic grievance (lower values indicates 
less development and hence more grievances). Purchasing power parity converted GDP per 
capita (constant in 2005 international dollars) data come from The Penn World Tables.  
Unemployment rates and education data may better capture the existence of economic 
grievances, but these data have many more missing observations. In fact, more than 50% of the 
observations of these two variables are missing in the World Bank data. I utilize the Cingranelli- 
Richards (CIRI) data to measure state repression. The Physical Integrity Rights Index is an 
additive index constructed from torture, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and 
disappearance indicators. It ranges from 0 (no government respect for these four rights) to 8 (full 
government respect for these four rights). I rescale the CIRI scores from 1 to 9 in which higher 
values indicate less government respect of human rights and more repression to make 
interpretation easier. I also include a squared term of repression to capture the hypothesized 
curvilinear relationship between state repression and conflict onset. Natural resource and oil 
dependence data come from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. Natural resource 
dependence measures the sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents (hard and soft), mineral 
rents, and forest rents as a percentage of GDP. Oil rents are the difference between the value of 
crude oil production at world prices and total costs of production as a percentage of GDP. 
Finally, the data on the proportion of young males between the age of 15 and 24 to total adult 




I also include the following control variables, which are expected to increase the risk of 
domestic conflict (based on the findings of previous studies): ethnic fractionalization and 
religious fractionalization, a dummy for transitionary regimes, percentage of mountainous 
terrain, and total population. I use the polity 2 score from the Polity IV project to control for 
regime type. Previous research suggests that there is an inverted-U shaped relationship between 
regime type and domestic armed conflict onset and transitionary regimes are more conflict prone 
(Hegre et al. 2001) I create a dummy variable to operationalize transitionary regimes; the 
countries that have polity 2 score between -5 and +5 are coded as anocracies. Ethnic and 
religious fractionalization data come from Fearon and Laitin (2003). I extrapolate the data for 
years after 2000. Both ethnic and religious fractionalization in a society hardly change over time. 
The ethnic fractionalization index gives the probability that two randomly selected individuals in 
a country are from different ethno-linguistic groups. Similarly, the religious fractionalization 
index measures the probability that two randomly selected individuals in a country are from 
different religions. Lastly, I use the natural log of GDP per capita, percentage of mountainous 
terrain, and the population. The variables GDP per capita and repression are lagged one year to 
avoid problems in inferring causal direction. Table 2.1 summarizes the list of variables used in 
the empirical analysis and how the concepts are operationalized. 
Table 2.1 about here 
Since the dependent variable is dichotomous, I use a logistic regression statistical 
estimator to test my hypotheses, with robust standard errors clustered by country. Domestic 
armed conflict is a rare event; King and Zeng (2001) point out that standard logistic regression 
models might produce biased coefficient estimates when the proportion of zeroes to ones is very 




event issue can generate any significantly different outcomes in the analysis. To control for 
unobserved heterogeneity which typically exists in a time-series-cross-sectional data set, I 
employ a random effect model as well. To address the problem of temporal dependence— the 
fact that for a given country, many observations over time are statistically related— I follow the 
advice of  Carter and Signorino (2010) by adding number of peace years since the last conflict, 
peace years squared, and a cubic term of peace years to each model.  Carter and Signorino 
(2010) argue that polynomial approximation is less complex and easier to interpret than using 
natural cubic splines suggested by Beck et al (1998). Finally, I report the pairwise correlations of 
the independent variables to assess multicollinearity.  The correlation matrices are included in 
Table 2.5 in the Appendix 19.  
F. Findings 
If we only look at the proportion of Muslim-plurality countries and the proportion of 
domestic armed conflicts, Islam plurality states are indeed more conflict-prone. Sixty two of 163 
intra-state conflicts (38%) occurred in Muslim-plurality states, whereas 26.5 % of all states have 
Muslim-plurality population.  Six percent of Muslim-plurality states and 4% of all countries 
experienced intra-state conflict respectively. Yet, a closer look at some of the explanatory 
variables that increase the risk of domestic conflict suggest that Muslim-plurality countries are 
also associated with lower levels of life expectancy, lower GDP per capita, oil-dependent 
economies, higher proportion of young males, more state repression and autocratic governments. 
                                                 
9 There is a high correlation between GDP per capita and youth bulges (-.76) which leads to some concern about 
multicollinearity in the model. Unfortunately, there is no statistical method to overcome the multicollineaity 
problem. As Arceneaux and Huber (2007) notes, dropping one of the collinear variables from the model can bias 
coefficient estimates whereas multicollinearity only makes estimates less precise. Moreover, the youth bulge 
variable remains insignificant when I drop GDP per capita from Models 4, 5, and 6. Similarly, the impact of GDP 
per capita does not change when youth bulge is dropped from Models 4, 5, and 6. The findings do not change when 
GDP per capita is dropped from Model 7 whereas Islam-youth interaction loses significance when GDP per capita is 
dropped from Model 8. I decided to keep both GDP per capita and youth bulges in the regression models since 
dropping one of the collinear variables might lead to ommitted variable bias which is deemed to be more severe than 




The median GDP per capita in Muslim-plurality states is $2,761, whereas it is an average of 
$7,011 for other countries and an average of $5,537 for the world. Similarly, median life 
expectancy in Muslim-plurality states is 65.6 compared to an average of 70.1 in other countries. 
The median polity score in Muslim-plurality states is only -6 compared to +7 in other countries. 
On average, oil rents constitute 14.9% of GDP in Muslim-plurality states whereas only 0.025% 
of GDP comes from oil rents in other countries. The proportion of young males is 21% higher in 
Muslim-plurality states compared to other countries whereas the CIRI integrity score is 20% 
lower (which indicates that Muslim-plurality states more often have repressive regimes). Table 
2.2 compares descriptive statistics of Muslim-plurality countries to non-Islamic countries. Given 
the lower levels of GDP per capita, lower life expectancy, a lack of democracy, more repressive 
regimes, higher proportion of young males, and oil or natural resource dependent economies, it is 
not surprising to find higher rates of domestic conflict in Muslim-plurality countries. The 
comparison of main explanatory variables in Muslim-plurality states and other states provide 
suggests that both grievances−which motivate rebellion−, and natural resources, and human 
resources−which provide opportunity to rebel− are more prevalent in the Muslim world.     
Table 2.2 about here 
 In order to better explore role of religion in domestic armed conflict onset, I first estimate 
several bivariate regressions. Then, I specify a more complete theoretical model and examine 
several interactions. In Model 1, I regress domestic armed conflict onset on Islam and include 
only peace years, and its polynomial combinations to control for temporal dependence.  Islam is 
positive and significant which provides support for Hypothesis 1 if we overlook other factors that 
make countries more conflict-prone.  However, the statistical significance of the Islam dummy 




Repression is positive and significant whereas the squared term is negative and significant which 
confirms the curvilinear relationship between repression and domestic armed conflict onset. In 
Model 3, I drop the repression and add oil dependence to the regression. Similarly, the Islam 
dummy becomes insignificant when oil dependence is controlled for even though oil dependence 
alone is not significant either. The bivariate regression results suggest that the Islamic faith alone 
does not make countries more conflict prone once we control for even just one other variable that 
increases the risk of conflict. Table 2.3 shows the results of these regressions.  
Table 2.3 about here 
In Model 4, I develop a general domestic armed conflict onset model to explore the role 
of Islam in promoting conflict once one controls for the correlates of domestic armed conflict. I 
include ethnic fractionalization, oil rents, logged GDP per capita, repression and its squared 
term, proportion of young males, a dummy for anocracies, a Muslim-plurality dummy, and the 
percentage of mountainous terrain. Ethnic fractionalization, population, anocracy, and oil rents 
significantly increase the risk of domestic armed conflict whereas religious fractionalization and 
Muslim-plurality are negative but insignificant. Repression is positive and significant whereas its 
squared term is negative and significant, which confirms the curvilinear relationship between 
state repression and domestic armed conflict. The graph in Figure 2.1 shows the relationship 
between the predicted probability of domestic armed conflict and repression10 . This finding 
supports Hypothesis 3; repression initially increases the risk of domestic armed conflict due to 
increasing grievances but extreme levels of repression decreases the risk of conflict since 
collective action becomes very costly and hence rebel groups are deterred. One potential critique 
of the impact of repression could be the potential endogeneity problem; increasing repressive 
                                                 




measures by a state may be part of the conflict rather than a cause of the conflict which later 
escalates into domestic armed conflict. Yet similar arguments could be made for other correlates 
of domestic armed conflict such as GDP per capita and regime type, which are commonly 
included in domestic armed conflict onset models. I lagged the measure of repression one year to 
mitigate this problem. As a robustness check, I also lagged the measure of repression for two 
years and it remained statistically significant. Moreover, I drop ongoing conflict years and use 
onset of domestic armed conflict as my dependent variable, which mitigates endogeneity 
problems.  
Figure 2.1 about here 
Unlike previous studies, GDP per capita and youth bulge do not seem to affect the risk of 
domestic armed conflict. States characterized by oil-dependent economies, repressive regimes, 
transitionary political institutions, and ethnic diversity are more conflict-prone, whereas neither 
Islam nor religious diversity has any significant effect. For a robustness test, I used both King 
and Zeng (2001)’s Relogit procedure and a random effects model. The results did not change.  I 
also replaced the Muslim-plurality dummy with Muslim proportion and the results again did not 
change11. One can reasonably conclude that there is little support for Hypothesis 1.  
In model 5, I drop oil rents and replace it with natural resource rents.  Like oil rents, 
natural resource rents also positively and significantly affect the likelihood of domestic armed 
conflict onset. The anocracy variable loses significance whereas GDP per capita becomes 
negative and significant. The number of observations increases by about 500 in this model (since 
the variable oil rents has more missing data), which might be the reason for slightly different 
                                                 




findings. Alternatively, inclusion of oil rents might be the reason for the insignificance of GDP 
per capita in Model 4. Even though wealthier countries are expected to be less conflict-prone, 
those countries with both high GDP per capita and highly oil-dependent economies might 
actually still be vulnerable to domestic conflict. Islam is still insignificant and again, replacing 
the Muslim-plurality dummy with Muslim proportion does not change the results. In model 6, I 
add a dummy variable for countries in which Christianity is the most commonly practiced 
religion. Like Islam, Christianity is also insignificant.  
Overall, these findings suggest that religious denomination alone does not necessarily 
make countries more or less conflict-prone. State repression, which is previously ignored in 
many studies, significantly affects the likelihood of domestic conflict, whereas the impact of 
other variables is similar to previous studies. Even though Muslim-plurality countries are no 
more conflict prone than others once one controls for the correlates of domestic armed conflict, 
one may wonder what may account for the higher proportion of domestic armed conflicts in the 
Muslim world. In other words, what explains the variation in conflict-proneness of Muslim-
plurality countries specifically? To answer this question, I interact various explanatory variables 
with Islam. The interactions of Islam dummy with all of the explanatory variables were all 
insignificant except youth bulges-Islam interaction. In Model 7, I interact the proportion of 
young males with the Muslim-plurality dummy. Muslim-plurality dummy becomes negative and 
significant whereas the interaction of Muslim-plurality and young male proportion is positive 
and significant. Interestingly, religious fractionalization is negative and significant in Model 7. 
Unlike theoretical expectations, increasing religious heterogeneity seems to decrease the risk of 
domestic armed conflict. Islam-youth interaction remains significant when I replace oil rents 




more conflict prone, they do increase the risk of domestic armed conflict in Muslim-plurality 
countries. Yet, it is important to note that this finding is not robust to alternative model 
specifications; Islam-youth interaction loses significance when I use a random-effects model or 
when the Islam dummy is replaced with proportion of Muslims living in a country.12 These 
findings are summarized in Table 2.4 
Table 2.4 about here 
The significance of Islam-youth interaction is a theoretical puzzle, which can be explored 
by future research. Theoretically, youth bulges alone do not create problems in a society. Young 
people usually become more prone to use of violence when they face unfavorable socio-
economic and political conditions such as unemployment, poverty, income inequality, repressive, 
and autocratic regimes. I control for economic development with GDP per capita, which is a very 
crude proxy variable. The existing cross-national data about unemployment or other socio-
economic indicators such as income inequality or education have many missing observations. In 
addition to these potential explanations, young people are more exposed to the external world, 
which increase grievances and perceptions of relative deprivation. Moreover, social media 
networks such as Facebook and Twitter make it easier for young people to communicate with 
each other, to spread their ideas, to mobilize and rebel against governments. Indeed, young 
people played a crucial role during Arab Spring.  
I also estimate the analysis by adding the interactions of Islam and GDP per capita, Islam 
and oil, Islam and repression, Islam and anocracy, and Islam and ethnic fractionalization one at a 
time to the model. None of the interactions were statistically significant. When I conduct the 
                                                 




analysis for only Muslim-plurality countries, ethnic fractionalization, repression and youth bulge 
are positive and significant whereas the squared term of repression is negative and significant. 
Surprisingly, oil-dependence does not seem to make Muslim countries more conflict-prone even 
though there is a high correlation between Muslim-plurality and oil rents (0.44), and oil in 
general increases the risk of conflict.  
Finally, I calculate predicted probabilities for domestic armed conflict onset to explore 
the substantive effect of other explanatory variables using Model 813. Domestic armed conflict is 
a rare event; the predicted probability of domestic armed conflict is only one percent when all 
explanatory variables are held at their mean values and dummy variables are set to 0. The risk of 
domestic armed conflict increases by 240% (from 0.004 to 0.014) when repression shifts from 
10th percentile to 90th percentile value while all explanatory variables are held at their mean 
values and dummy variables are set to 0. Similarly, a shift in ethnic fractionalization from 10th to 
90th percentile leads to 208% increase in the risk of domestic armed conflict. The substantive 
impact of GDP per capita and natural resource dependence are relatively small; the risk of 
domestic armed conflict decreases by 72% when logged GDP per capita shifts from 10th to 90th 
percentile value whereas a shift from 10th to 90th percentile in natural resource dependence 
leads to only a 34% increase in the risk of war. The probability of domestic armed conflict 
increases by 224% when logged total population shifts from 10th percentile to 90th percentile 
whereas a shift of log of percentage of mountainous terrain from 10th to 90th percentile leads to 
90% increase in the probability of domestic armed conflict.  
 
                                                 





What explains variation in the prevalence of domestic armed conflicts in the Muslim world and 
to which extent could religion play a role in fostering violence? In this chapter, I conduct a time-
series and cross-national analysis to find answers to preceding research questions. Several 
conclusions can be drawn from the analysis. Most importantly, contrary to suggestions and 
claims in the literature, religion by itself does not promote conflict; religious diversity is negative 
and insignificant in all of the regressions. Second, intra-state conflicts are indeed more prevalent 
in Muslim-plurality states, but social, economic, and political conditions in these states create an 
environment which is very susceptible to domestic armed conflicts. Muslim-plurality states are 
characterized by a higher proportion of youth bulges, more repressive regimes, oil dependent 
economies, and lower GDP per capita. Religious denomination does not seem to make countries 
more or less conflict prone once one controls for these socio-economic and political conditions. 
Both Muslim-plurality and interactions of Muslim-plurality with various explanatory variables 
remain insignificant in most of the regressions even after trying different operationalization of 
Islam –use of Muslim-plurality or Muslim proportion−, and alternative model specifications 
(Random-effects model, logit and relogit). Third, state repression, which is overlooked in 
previous studies, is significant in all of the models. Repression initially increases risk of conflict 
due to increasing grievances, but extreme levels of repression actually decreases the risk of 
conflict since rebel groups are deterred. Fourth, the insignificance of Islam*oil interaction or oil 
rents when the analysis is run for only Muslim countries is puzzling; previous studies about the 
causes of domestic armed conflict suggest that oil dependence increases the risk of conflict 
(Fearon 2005; Ross 2012). Yet, oil dependence does not seem to increase the risk of conflict in 




explanation could be that leaders may use oil money to co-opt or contain potential dissidents and 
thus prevent domestic conflicts as suggested by Fjelde (2009). Gause (2011) argues that 
autocratic leaders in the Arab world successfully co-opted and contained mobilizations against 
the governments until very recently. Finally, even though interactions of Islam with many 
explanatory variables are insignificant, Islam-youth bulge interaction positively affects risk of 
domestic conflict. Future studies may focus on exploring the causal mechanisms by which youth 
bulges increases risk of domestic armed conflict in the Muslim world. Some scholars argue that 
youth bulges have played a significant role during the recent uprisings in the Middle East; those 
young people, dissatisfied with their oppressive regimes and frustrated with unemployment, 
rebelled against their governments (Hoffman and Jamal 2012; Mohammed 2011). Future 
research can test conditional impact of youth bulges by interacting youth bulge with 
unemployment rate, and education. All in all, this chapter contributes to the literature by 
exploring causal factors that increase risk of domestic conflict in Muslim-plurality states as well 
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Appendix 1: List of Tables 
 
Table 2.1: Summary of Variables  




Dummy for countries in which Islam is the most commonly 
practiced religion 
Log of GDP per capita Economic grievances 
Repression (rescaled CIRI score) Political	constraints	 (repression) 
Oil rents (% of GDP) Rentier	state	status 
Natural resource rents (% of GDP) Rentier	state	status 
Muslim proportion Religion 
Anocracy  Political	opportunity	structure	(control	variable) 
Youth bulge Human	resources 
Ethnic fractionalization                                 Ethnic diversity (control variable) 
Religious fractionalization              Religious diversity(control variable) 
Log of total population Population(control variable) 



































	7011.4	 	11814 136 89814 
Life 
expectancy 
65.6 10.3 38.1 77.9 Life exp. 70.09 10.5 30.4 82.9 
CIRI integrity 5 1.96 0 888 CIRI 
integrity 
6 2.01 0 8 
Polity −6 5.4 -10 9 Polity 7 7.02 -10 10 
Prop. of 
young males 
0.34 0.06 0.14 0.42 Prop. of 
young males 
0.28 0.08 0.11 0.47 
Oil rents 
(%of GDP) 
14.9 18.3 0 103.2 Oil rents 
(%of GDP) 
0.025 10.05 0 79.5 
Natural 
resource 
rents (% of 
GDP) 
9.8 25.3 0 214.4 Natural 
resource 
rents (% of 
GDP) 
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Table 2.3 Bivariate Regressions 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  
Islam .463* .0456 .292  
 (.250) (.290) (.306)  
Repression  1.12***   
  (.281)   
Repression square  -0.081***   
  (.029)   
Oil rents     .01  
   (.006)  
Peace years -.72*** -.44*** -.741***  
 (.160) (.174) (.178)  
Peace years2 .066*** .036** .062***  
 (.018) (.017) (.019)  
Peace years3 -.0014***     -.001** -.002***  
 (.000)             (.000) (.000)  
N 4079       3443 3071  
 
 
Note: Logit regressions, dependent variable: war onset. Standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks (*, **, ***) 


























Table 2.4: Risk of Domestic Armed Conflict (1981-2009)  
 
 
Variables Model 4    Model 5    Model 6    Model 7     Model 8 
Repression 
a
    .832**     .586*    .807**   .895**         .641**  
 (.377) (.302)   (.372)    (.379)            (.298) 
Repression squared 
a
 -.07* -.049 -.068* -.0771**         -.054* 
 (.038) (.031) (.038) (.039)           (.031) 
GDP per capita 
a b 
   -.129 -.353*     -.182 -.209               -.390** 
 
   (.215) (.184)     (.214)  (.220)            (.192) 
Ethnic fractionalization 2.27*** 1.545** 2.30*** 2.36***          1.606*** 
 (.671) (.645) (.674) (.688)            (.666) 
Religious fractionalization -1.049 -.663 -1.122 -1.183*             -.689  
 (.732) (.702) (.736) (.730)               (.681) 
Oil rents (% of GDP) .021**  .0212** .020** 
 (.008)  (.009) (.009) 
Natural resource rents (% 
of GDP) 
 .009*                             .010* 
  (.005)                           (.006) 
Youth bulge(15-24/15+) -4.084 -1.792    -4.232 -5.451*          -3.735 
 (3.247) (3.128) (3.184) (3.282)            (3.239) 
Islam -.413 -.024 -.234 -4.65**         -3.983** 
 (.344) (.317) (.434) (2.099)             (1.995) 
Islam*Youth bulge    13.205**            11.598** 
    (6.109)            (5.595) 
Christian    .307 .297 
   (.351) (.354) 
Anocracy .632** .415 .656** .605*         .394 
 (.320) (.279) (.322) (.321)           (.274) 
Population 
b
 .373*** .276** .399*** .397***       .274** 
 (.128) (.110) (.126) (.130)            (.111)  
% of Mountainous terrain 
b 
.165* .155* .167 .176*           .191** 
 (.103) (.092) (.104) (.102)            (.095) 
Peace years
 
-.229 -.259* -.231 -.228           -.248* 
 (.149) (.137) (.147) (.145)            (.138) 
Peace years
2
 .011 .019 .011 .010             .018 
 (.014) (.013) (.013) (.013)            (.013) 
Peace years
3
 -.000 -.000 -.000 -.000            -.000 
 (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)           (.000) 
 
    
N     2497        3007       2497       2497            3007 
 
Note: Logit regressions, dependent variable: war onset. Standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks (*, **, ***) 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. All regressions include an intercept (not reported). 























Ethnic fr. PopulationGDP capitaYouth bulgePolity Natural res.Relig. Fr.Muslim prop.Mount. Ter.CIRI Oil rents
Ethnic fr. 1.00
Population -0.02 1.00
GDP capita -0.38 -0.08 1.00
Youth bulge 0.45 -0.02 -0.77 1.00
Polity -0.21 -0.08 0.32 -0.44 1.00
Natural res. 0.15 -0.05 -0.07 0.24 -0.44 1.00
Relig. Fr. 0.38 0.08 0.06 -0.01 -0.04 0.03 1.00
Muslim prop. 0.10 -0.05 -0.14 0.29 -0.58 0.41 -0.12 1.00
Mount. Ter. 0.01 0.16 -0.14 0.10 0.07 -0.03 -0.20 0.04 1.00
CIRI -0.24 -0.27 0.54 -0.53 0.46 -0.23 0.07 -0.29 -0.24 1.00
Oil rents 0.10 -0.04 0.01 0.19 -0.45 0.82 0.04 0.40 -0.08 -0.22 1.00
Islam 0.02 -0.04 -0.10 0.25 -0.52 0.42 -0.14 0.95 0.03 -0.27 0.42





Table 2.6: Random-Effects Model 
Variables Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Islam -.412 -.012 -.234 -4.795 -4.25 
 (.353) (.364) (.434) (3.5) (2.938) 
Islam*Youth bulge    13.139 12.44 
    (10.33) (8.464) 
Repression 
a
 .832** .704** .808** .922** .746** 
 (.391) (.331) (.392) (.398) (.33) 
Repression squared 
a
 -.07* -.06* -.068* -.079** -.064** 
 (.036) (.032) (.036) (.037) (.032) 
GDP per capita 
a b 
-.129 -.316 -.181 -.157 -.365* 
 (.2) (.199) (.214) (.206) (.2) 
Ethnic fractionalization
 
2.266*** 1.753** 2.3*** 2.325*** 1.757*** 
 (.675) (.675) (.683) (.676) (661) 
Religious fractionalization -1.105 -.48 -1.122 -1.113 -.509 
 (.825) (.855) (.84) (.826) (.84) 
Oil rents (% of GDP) .021**  .021** .020**  
 (.009)  (.009) (.009)  
Natural res. rents (% of GDP)  .009   .011 
  (.007)   (.006) 
Youth bulge(15-24/15+) -4.082 -.132 -4.232 -5.374 -2.4 
 (3.57) (3.75) (3.184) (3.654) (3.86) 
Christian    .307 .296  
   (.41) .(415)  
Anocracy .631** .416 .656** .582* .401 
 (.314) (.281) (.316) (.315) (.28) 
Population 
b
 .373*** .35*** .399*** .370*** .338*** 
 (.112) (.123) (.117) (.112) (.12) 
% of Mountainous terrain 
b
 .165 .192* .168 .172 .224* 
 (.118) (.116) (.12) (.117) (.116) 
Peace years -.229 -.15 -.231 -.227 -.151 
 (.149) (.148) (.149) (.149) (.146) 
Peace years
2
 .01 .012 .011 .01 .011 
 
(.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.0145) 
Peace years
3
 -.000 -.000 -.000 -.000 -.000 
 
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 






Table 2.7: Relogit Model 
Variables Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Islam -.397 -.024 -.244 -4.325 -3.873 
 (.341) (.316) (.431) (1.98) (1.984) 
Islam*Youth bulge    11.877** 11.324** 
    (5.859) (5.565) 
Repression 
a
 .762** .542* .739** .849** .599** 
 (.376) (.3) (.37) (.383) (.297) 
Repression squared 
a
 -.063* -.044 -.062* -.072* -.049* 
 (.037) (.03) (.037) (.038) (.03) 
GDP per capita 
a b 
-.134 -.352* -.182 -.159 -.386** 
 (.213) (.183) (.212) (.219) (.19) 
Ethnic fractionalization
 
2.162*** 1.489**   2.197*** 2.2*** 1.542** 
 (.666) (.642) (.666) (.68) (663) 
Religious fractionalization -1.001 -.655 -1.055 -1.061 -.672 
 (.727) (.698) (.73) (.723) (.677) 
Oil rents (% of GDP) .021**  .021** .020**  
 (.008)  (.008) (.009)  
Natural res. rents (% of GDP)  .009*   .011* 
  (.005)   (.005) 
Youth bulge(15-24/15+) -4.05 -.1.868 -4.157 -5.255 -3.765 
 (3.227) (3.11) (3.163) (3.32) (3.222) 
Christian    .274 .254  
   (.348) (.351)  
Anocracy .624** .414 .645** .596* .392 
 (.318) (.277) (.32) (.318) (.273) 
Population 
b
 .362*** .271** .385*** .378*** .268** 
 (.127) (.109) (.125) (.129) (.111) 
% of Mountainous terrain 
b
 .161 .153* .162 .168* .188** 
 (.102) (.09) (.1) (.1) (.094) 
Peace years -.204 -.237* -.2 -.202 -.226* 
 (.147) (.136) (.146) (.144) (.136) 
Peace years
2
 .07 .016 .07 .07 .015 
 
(.014) (.013) (.013) (.013) (.013) 
Peace years
3
 -.000 -.000 -.000 -.000 -.000 
 
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 







Table 2.8: Regressions with Muslim Proportion  
Variables Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Muslim prop. -.003 .000 .000 -.027 -.032 
 (.003) (.003) (.005) (.024) (.021) 
Muslim*Youth bulge    .085 .097 
    (.073) (.063) 
Repression 
a
 .831** .587* .793** .858** .638** 
 (.384) (.302) (.377) (.396) (.31) 
Repression squared 
a
 -.07* -.049 -.067* -.074* -.053* 
 (.039) (.031) (.038) (.04) (.031) 
GDP per capita 
a b 
-.127 -.349* -.203 -.217 -.373** 
 (.215) (.182) (.214) (.217) (.186) 
Ethnic fractionalization
 
2.245*** 1.524** 2.277*** 2.325*** 1.575** 
 (.675) (.652) (.679) (.685) (.671) 
Religious fractionalization -.954 -.613 -1.072 -1.067 -.558 
 (.772) (.694) (.732) (.723) (.681) 
Oil rents (% of GDP) .019**  .019** .02**  
 (.009)  (.008) (.009)  
Natural res. rents (% of GDP)  .008   .009* 
  (.005)   (.005) 
Youth bulge(15-24/15+) -4.288 -.1.838 -4.451 -5.88* -3.931 
 (3.258) (3.107) (3.178) (3.52) (3.436) 
Christian    .483 .454  
   (.395) (.398)  
Anocracy .64** .415 .682** .661** .404 
 (.323) (.278) (.327) (.326) (.277) 
Population 
b
 .353*** .273*** .402*** .394*** .266** 
 (.125) (.105) (.124) (.126) (.107) 
% of Mountainous terrain 
b
 .172* .156* .165 .175* .185** 
 (.103) (.09) (.104) (.103) (.093) 
Peace years -.235 -.259* -.235 -.234 -.252* 
 (.149) (.137) (.148) (.147) (.137) 
Peace years
2
 .011 .019 .011 .011 .018 
 
(.014) (.013) (.013) (.013) (.013) 
Peace years
3
 -.000 -.000 -.000 -.000 -.000 
 
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
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Why do some ethno-political organizations resort to violence while others abstain from it? 
Are ethno-political organizations with a religious/Islamist ideology more violence-prone 
compared to non-religious ones? This chapter attempts to find answers to these questions 
by analyzing ethno-political organizations in the Middle East. The factors that increase a 
country’s risk of experiencing domestic armed conflicts are examined in the previous 
chapter. In this chapter, I conduct a group-level analysis and explore conditions under 
which ethno-political organizations prefer violent strategies to achieve their goals. I use the 
Minorities at Risk Organizational Behavior (MAROB) dataset, which includes 118 
organizations in 16 countries of the Middle East and North Africa to test my hypotheses. 
Even though the level of analysis and also degree of violence differs from the previous 
chapter, the findings suggest that similar causal factors that promote domestic armed 
conflict such as socio-economic grievances, existence of repressive states, and youth 
bulges also increase the probability of use of violent strategies by ethno-political 



































“Youth have played a prominent role in political violence throughout recorded history and 
the existence of a “youth bulge” has historically been associated with times of political 
crises” (Goldstone 2001:95) 
 
“The Middle East is facing a demographic bulge in which youth aged fifteen to twenty-nine 
comprise the largest proportion of the population. These young people, frustrated with the 
lack of jobs, have been at the forefront of anti-government protests” (Assaad 2011, cited in 
Hoffman and Jamal 2012:169) 
 
In the previous chapter, I examined causal factors that increase a country’s risk of experiencing 
domestic armed conflict. This chapter builds on those analyses by focusing on factors that 
increase the probability of violence at the group-level rather than country-level. I explore 
conditions under which ethno-political organizations prefer violent strategies to achieve their 
goals. Kalyvas (2006) calls for studies that incorporate micro, meso and macro level data into a 
coherent picture of violence within domestic armed conflicts and other irregular conflicts. This 
dissertation aims to do so by building a bridge between the research on domestic armed conflicts, 
contentious politics, social movements, and radicalization, and testing similar hypotheses at the 
state and group levels. Even though the level of analysis and also degree of violence differs from 
the previous chapter, similar causal factors that promote domestic armed conflict such as socio-
economic grievances and the existence of repressive states are also used to explain the adoption 
of violent strategies by ethno-political organizations. Therefore, I test similar hypotheses to the 
ones examined in the previous chapter.  
Ethno-political organizations are politically active communal groups. Gurr (1993:161) 
defines communal groups as “cultural and religious identity groups that do not have recognized 
states or institutionalized political status”. The review of the literature suggests that ethno-




political opportunity structures, resource mobilization, organizational structure, and the ideology 
of the organization. In addition to these commonly cited factors, I argue that the existence of 
youth bulges in a society also increase the probability of adopting violent strategies by ethno-
political organizations.  Frustrated young males under repressive and authoritarian regimes tend 
to be likely recruits for violent organizations. I utilize the Minorities at Risk Organizational 
Behavior (MAROB) dataset to test my hypotheses. The dataset includes 118 organizations in 16 
countries of the Middle East and North Africa, operating between 1980 and 2004. The empirical 
findings confirm that youth bulges, state repression, organizational fractionalization, external 
support for the organization, and economic grievances positively affect adoption of violent 
strategies by ethno-political organizations, whereas an increasing GDP growth rate has a 
pacifying impact. Ethno-political organizations that have a religious/ Islamist ideology are no 
more conflict-prone than other organizations. These findings are consistent with the findings of 
the previous chapter; socio-economic factors and political opportunities/constraints rather than 
religion drives the decision to resort to violence.   
This chapter is organized as follows. First I review the literature on contentious politics, 
social movements, and radicalization and derive testable hypothesis. Next, I describe the data, 
methods, and the research design. Then, I discuss the empirical findings. Finally, I provide a 
brief conclusion in which I discuss implications of these findings as well as the limitations of this 
research.  
C. Literature Review 
While some ethno-political organizations prefer to use conventional means to advance their 
interests such as participation in elections, others engage in either nonviolent protest or violent 




and nonviolent strategies used by organizations such as protest and rebellion.  They define 
contentious politics as “interactions in which actors make claims bearing on someone else’s 
interests, leading to coordinated efforts on behalf of shared interests or programs  in which 
governments are involved as targets, initiators of claims, or third parties” (Tilly and Tarrow 
2007:4). Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) find that nonviolent campaigns are actually more 
successful than violent campaigns in achieving political goals. Yet, violence is regarded as a 
viable option and used by many ethno-political organizations. Why do some ethno-political 
organizations choose violence rather than conventional politics or protest, which is less risky, 
less costly, and tends to be more successful in achieving political goals? What factors influence 
ethno-political groups’ choice of violent vs nonviolent strategies? The review of the literature 
suggests that there are five broad concepts, which affect decisions to use violent or nonviolent 
strategies by ethno-political organizations: grievances, resource mobilization, political 
opportunity structures, organizational structure, and the ideology of the organization. In addition 
to these factors, I argue that ethno-political organizations, which are active in societies with a 
large youth population, tend to be more violence-prone. Below, I first review these concepts and 
point out the weaknesses of existing literature. Then, I explain how youth bulges may foster the 
use of violence by ethno-political organizations and conclude this section with my testable 
hypothesis.  
Grievances 
According to Gurr (1970)’s relative deprivation hypothesis, grievances, which stem from 
inequalities− either subjective or objective−, lead to frustration and motivate collective violence. 
In other words, the difference between the expectations of an individual and what the individual 




access to information have increased awareness of inequalities, increased expectations, and 
consequently deepened the feelings of frustration. Regan (2009) confirms that grievances that 
stem from poverty, inequality, and discrimination lead to violence. Gurr (1993) argues that 
grievances are especially critical in early stages of group mobilization but become less 
significant once people are committed to collective action. In other words, leaders initially use 
grievances to mobilize people for collective action and recruit potential rebels but once the 
conflict process begins, it becomes a self-sustaining dynamic. 
  The literature on social movements also focuses on grievances and structural and 
psychological causes of mass mobilization. It is argued that structural factors such as 
modernization (rapid economic liberalization and industrialization) or economic crises disrupt 
social life and create a sense of despair and anxiety which in turn makes joining social 
movements attractive. Likewise, Islamic activism is explained by socio-psychological factors as 
well as grievances; the popularity of Islamist movements is explained by a power vacuum, which 
emerged due to the failure of autocratic regimes and secular modernization projects to promote 
economic development (Ayoob 2005; Fox 2004; Moghadam 2009; Wiktorowicz 2004).  
While the corrupt, authoritarian regimes in many Muslim countries fail to provide social 
services, Islamists fill this vacuum through charity organizations. Islamist parties, which are very 
popular in many Muslim countries, are regarded as being less corrupt than other parties. It is 
argued that rapid structural and demographic dislocations during the postcolonial period also 
contributed to a sense of relative deprivation and alienation. While literacy rates and education 
increased, these educated new elites could not find employment or they were underemployed. 
Moreover, the modernization process increased expectations among people (Hafez 2003). Ansari 




Studies show that militant Islamist tend to come from familiar backgrounds; educated students 
and professionals in their twenties and thirties, members of the lower middle class, recent 
migrants to cities, unemployed or underemployed. In addition to these domestic grievances, 
globally, surveys show that Muslims are dissatisfied with the international status quo, especially 
with the US foreign policy. The US support of Israel and the Iraq war in 2003 are among the 
commonly cited political grievances (Ayoob 2005; Harrigan and El-Said 2011). 
While social movement theory focuses on groups as the unit of analysis and provides 
group level explanation of political violence, the literature on terrorism is insightful in providing 
individual level explanations for radicalization and the decision to use violence. Even though 
unfavorable socio-economic conditions, such as poverty and low levels of education, are 
sometimes associated with terrorism, Krueger and Maleckova (2003) and Russel’s (1983) 
findings suggest that poverty and lack of education do not necessarily lead to higher rates of 
terrorism. Russel and Miller (1983) examine the profile of 350 terrorists from revolutionary 
groups and find that the majority of these terrorists were in fact well educated and come from 
middle or upper-middle classes. Therefore, inequalities and injustices are deemed to be more 
influential than poverty in driving violent extremism (El-Said and Barret 2011).  
Still, some scholars are skeptical about the impact of grievances in fostering violence; 
they argue that such discontent exists in all societies (Hafez 2003; Wiktorowicz 2004). Existing 
studies provide mixed evidence regarding the impact of grievances in promoting violence. Gurr 
(1993) observes that political grievances such as the historical loss of autonomy and differential 
political status increase the probability of rebellion whereas severe political discrimination and 
cultural grievances decrease it. Gurr and Moore (1997) find that grievances don’t have a direct 




turn increases the risk of rebellion. Regan and Norton (2005) find that political discrimination 
increases the risk of rebellion and civil war. Similarly, Cederman et al (2010) find that the 
probability of ethnic conflict increases if leaders of an ethnic group are excluded from central 
executive power or if they are underrepresented.  
Resource Mobilization Theory 
Resource mobilization theory, which is based on rational choice perspective, rose as a major 
challenge to the relative deprivation approach (Brush 1996). The resource mobilization theory 
emphasizes the ability of social movements to gain resources of power, to organize, to recruit 
members, and to provide individual incentives or coercion in motivating participation in social 
movement activities. According to resource mobilization theory, movements are rational, 
organizational manifestations of collective action. Collective action depends on members’ shared 
interests as well as organization and opportunities (Tilly 1978:55). The relative deprivation 
approach is criticized for ignoring the resources required to mobilize and maintain insurgency 
(Muller 1985). 
  Tilly (1969) argues that collective violence occurs when individuals believe that 
collective action will be successful and the expected benefits exceed the costs rather than when 
individuals have grievances. In other words, frustration is not sufficient for mobilization; groups 
need resources to translate individual frustration into group mobilization. Grievances exist in all 
societies and can easily be manufactured by the mobilizing efforts of movement entrepreneurs 
(McCarthy and Zald 1977). Hafez (2003) criticizes the relative deprivation hypothesis for 
ignoring the possibility that deprived individuals could also seek to advance their interests 




Weinstein (2006) finds that rebel groups that emerge in natural resource rich regions or 
those that have external support use higher levels of violence whereas movements that emerge in 
poor nations use violence selectively. Dalton et al (2010) use the World Value Survey to test the 
influence of relative deprivation and the availability of resources in driving protest. They find 
that protest increases not because of increasing grievances such as dissatisfaction with 
government, but because of the availability of resources. Similarly, Muller (1985) examines the 
relationship between income inequality−which is used to measure grievances− and collective 
political violence for the 1958-1977 periods and finds only a weak correlation between 
inequality and the number of death stemming from political violence. Muller (1985) concludes 
that discontent in general is weakly related to political violence whereas resources play a more 
significant role.   In sum, it is argued that both external and internal resources, which facilitate 
mobilization, are more crucial than grievances in driving collective violence (McCarthy and Zald 
1977). 
Political Process Approach 
The political process approach, originally developed by McAdam (1982), could be regarded as a 
modified version of resource mobilization theory. According to a political process approach, 
collective action is limited by external opportunities and constraints. Therefore, the decision to 
use violence by a group is influenced by the broader political context (Hafez 2003; McAdam 
1982; Tarrow 1998; Wiktorowicz 2004). McAdam (1982) points out three important factors that 
influence the organizations’ collective action: the level of organization within the group, the 
group’s belief in the probability of success of collective action, and the political opportunities 




catch-all term, the characteristics of the state and regime type are two key factors in shaping 
opportunities and constraints for organizations or social movements.  
In democratic and inclusive regimes, organizations have the option of participating in 
elections or protest rather than rebellion to search for their rights. Therefore, they will be less 
likely to adopt un-conventional, risky and violent strategies. On the other hand, exclusive and 
repressive regimes legitimize the use of violence since conventional political participation is not 
available (Hafez 2003; Wiktorowicz 2004). Tilly and Tarrow (2007) argue that violent rebellion 
is more likely to occur in low-capacity and non-democratic regimes. Similarly, Goodwin (2001) 
examines revolutionary movements between 1945 and 1991 and concludes that revolutionary 
movements do not occur just because of economic inequality but rather due to political 
oppression. Goodwin argues that revolutions are most likely to occur in authoritarian, exclusive, 
repressive, organizationally incoherent and militarily weak states. In other words, revolutions 
occur when “there is no other way out” (Trotsky 1961; cited in Goodwin 2001:26).  
State repression is another important factor in determining the choice of violent or non-
violent strategies by dissidents. Yet, there is no consensus among scholars regarding the impact 
of repression in motivating violence. Regan and Norton (2005) find that repression decreases 
protest but increases both rebellion and civil war. Lichbach (1987) argues that dissidents switch 
between violent and nonviolent protest depending on the government response. If the 
government responds to one type of protest with violence, the dissidents will switch to another 
type. Lichbach also argues that consistent government accommodative or repressive policies 
reduce dissent; inconsistent policies increase dissent. Gupta et al (1993) find that repression 
breeds both violent and nonviolent protests in democracies whereas there is a curvilinear 




and Muller (1985) confirm that there is a curvilinear relationship between repression and the 
probability of rebellion.  
Organizational Factors 
While external factors such as state institutions, resources, and grievances are influential in 
motivating adoption of violent strategies, internal factors such as organizational structure and 
ideology are also important in promoting violence. Inter-group or intra-group competition and 
group fractionalization foster violence (Borum 2011; Dalacoura 2011). According to the theory 
of outbidding, competing groups tend to radicalize and resort to violence to increase their 
support and to out-bid other groups (Bloom 2004; Lawrence 2010). Similarly, group 
fractionalization and intra-group competition lead less-motivated members to leave the group 
and thus increase group radicalization (Borum 2011).  
Finally, the ideology of an organization has the potential to influence the decision to 
resort to violence. Juergensmeyer (2003) argues that religious organizations tend to be more 
violent since they believe that God is their primary audience and they see the enemy as evil. Toft 
(2007) notes that violent conflict is regarded as a manifestation of God’s will in religious 
traditions. Among all religions, Islam is the most commonly associated with political violence as 
discussed in the previous chapter. If Islam is inherently prone to violence as argued by some 
scholars, ethno-political organizations with an Islamist ideology should be more likely to behave 
violently than others.  
In sum, the review of the literature suggests that all of the concepts discussed above− 
grievances, resources, political opportunities and constraints, ideology of the organization, and 
organizational structure− have the potential to promote violence. Numerous studies have tested 




or resources as well as political opportunities play a more important role in driving violence. 
This chapter intends to shed light on these grievances versus resources debates by examining the 
impact of grievances, resources, and political opportunities in motivating violence by ethno-
political organizations in the Middle East. Moreover, this chapter examines the role of youth 
bulges in driving group-level violence, which has been ignored by existing studies. I argue that 
the existence of large youth cohorts also increases the probability of adoption of violence by 
ethno-political organizations since young people are more likely to be prone to violence.14 
Youth bulges lead to competition and scarcity in labor markets and educational systems, 
which in turn increases grievances and the potential for violence (Urdal 2004). Furthermore, 
large youth cohorts provide an excellent human resource for violent organizations. The 
opportunity cost of joining insurgency movements is usually lower for young people since they 
have less to lose (Collier 2000). Thus, a youth bulge has the potential to increase both grievances 
and available resources. Goldstone (2001) claims that youth population has historically been 
associated with political violence. Goldstone (2001) contends that well-educated youth are 
specifically more prone to political violence since they will have higher economic and political 
expectations. Resorting to violence becomes very likely if these educated youth are unemployed 
or underemployed and live in authoritarian countries in which conventional means of expressing 
frustration and political demands are usually unavailable.  Moller (1968) points out that the 
youth population played an important role during the French Revolution and the rise of Nazism 
in Germany in the 1930s (cited in Urdal 2004).  
                                                 
14 The brain’s prefrontal lobe, which is deemed to play an important role in preventing inappropriate behavior, does 




Youth bulges create instability in a society especially when social infrastructure is weak 
and demands of these youth are not met. Fuller (2003) argues that young people will be more 
prone to radical ideologies if they feel desperate and see few opportunities in the future (Fuller 
2003). Some evidence shows that rising youth population increases support for Islamist 
movements (Moghadam 2009; Urdal 2004).  For example, violent Islamist movements such as 
the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in Algeria and Gamaa Islamiyya in Egypt rely on young, 
uneducated, urban poor people (Dalacoura 2011). Indeed, youth population has played a 
significant role during the recent uprisings in the Middle East. Arguably, the large number of 
unemployed youth in Arab nations, frustrated under repressive, autocratic, and corrupt regimes, 
drove the Arab Spring (Mohammed 2011). For these young people who have a low socio-
economic status, participation in violent organizations becomes a tool for power and prestige, 
mitigates feeling of insecurity and helplessness and offers a sense of identity (Dalacoura 2011; 
Fuller 2003).  
The Middle Eastern region, which is analyzed in this chapter, has the highest proportion 
of youth population in the world: the average percentage of youth population−those under age of 
thirty− is around sixty percent compared to only thirty percent in North America (Hoffman and 
Jamal 2012). In addition to having a higher proportion of youth population, the unemployment 
rate is also highest in the Middle East. According to a report by the International Finance 
Corporation and Islamic Development Bank, the average youth (ages 15-24) unemployment rate 
in the Middle East is twenty five percent compared to twelve percent in the world as of 2010.15 
In sum, even though youth bulges is a theoretically significant concept, which has the 
potential to increase political violence, none of the existing studies quantitatively tested the 





impact of youth bulges in fostering violence at the group-level. This chapter fills this gap in the 
literature by examining the role of youth bulges in motivating the adoption of violent strategies 
by ethno-political organizations. I hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis: Ethno-political organizations that are active in countries in which there are 
large youth cohorts will be more likely to resort to violence.  
D. Data, Methods, and Research Design 
I examine the causal factors that increase ethno-political organizations’ probability of use of 
violence. A time-series cross-sectional dataset, which includes all active ethno-political 
organizations in the Middle East and North Africa, is used to empirically test the hypothesis. The 
Minorities at Risk Organizational Behavior (MAROB) project is a subsidiary of the Minorities at 
Risk (MAR) project. The dataset includes 118 organizations representing the interests of all 22 
ethno-political groups in 16 countries of the Middle East and North Africa, operating between 
1980 and 2004. The data are unbalanced panel data in an organization year format with 1,789 
observations. The MAROB data provides information about ideology, motivations, and 
strategies (both violent and non-violent) of organizations as well as the state behavior (repressive 
or tolerant towards the organization).  In order to be included in the dataset, an organization 
should meet the following criteria: 
1. The organization makes explicit claims to represent the interests of one or more 
ethnic groups and/or the organization’s members are primarily members of a specific 
ethnic minority. 
2. The organization is political in its goals and activities. 
3. The organization is active at a regional and/or national level. 




5. The organization is active for at least three consecutive years between 1980 and 
2006. 
6. Umbrella organizations (coalitions/alliances) are NOT coded. Instead, member 
organizations are coded (MAROB codebook 2008). 
The dependent variable is dichotomous; coded as 1 for the years during which the 
organization used violence as a strategy and coded as 0 otherwise. The dependent variable is a 
dummy variable, so I use a logistic regression statistical estimator to test my hypothesis, with 
robust standard errors clustered by country and organization.  I use two ordinal variables from 
MAROB data to create the dependent variable.16 These variables code the frequency of use of 
violence by organizations as a strategy. Since I am interested in whether the organization adopts 
a violent strategy or not rather than frequency of use of violence, I recoded these variables. Thus, 
organizations that use violence either to target domestic or transnational entities are coded as 1. 
In total, organizations used violence in 30.3 % of all organization years. I also include the 
correlation matrices in Table 3.1 to document multicollinearity; there is no multicollinearity 
problem.  
Table 3.1 about here 
Independent Variable and Control Variables 
My primary independent variable is the existence of youth bulges in a society. The data on the 
proportion of young males between the age of 15 and 24 to total adult male population (15+) 
come from the United Nations World Population Prospects data. I also control for the following 
variables in the empirical analysis since the review of the literature suggest that these variables 
                                                 
16 These variables are called “domorgviolence” and “transvioltarg” in the MAROB data, the description of variables 




have the potential to affect the likelihood of resorting to violence by organizations: democracy, 
state repression, political, economic, and cultural grievances, external support for organization, 
organizational popularity, organizational split, leadership type, religious/Islamist ideology, a 
dichotomous variable for organizations that operate in Israel, and GDP growth rate.   
Regime type and state repression intend to test the impact of political opportunity 
structure on the probability of violence by ethno-political organizations. Ethno-political 
organizations that are active in democratic countries are expected to be less violence-prone since 
other nonviolent strategies available could be less risky, less costly and hence more attractive.  I 
use the polity 2 score from the Polity IV project to control for regime type. I create a 
dichotomous variable for democracies by coding countries with Polity scores greater than five as 
one. Repression is like a double-edged sword; it can either deter or foster rebellion. Some 
scholars suggest that there is a curvilinear relationship between repression and dissidents’ 
probability of use of violence. While lower levels of repression may foster violence by 
increasing grievances, extreme repression can deter insurgency since collective action becomes 
very costly (Muller 1985). Unfortunately, it is not possible to test the curvilinear relationship 
between state repression and use of violence with MAROB data since the variable that measures 
state repression is an ordinal variable with only three categories. Therefore, I simply expect to 
find a positive correlation between state repression and political violence. The state violence 
measures whether the state uses lethal violence against the organization and ranges from 1 (no 
repression) to 3 (high repression). I create a dummy variable by combining the second (periodic 
lethal violence against the organization) and third (consistently high lethal repression of the 





Even though the empirical evidence is mixed, grievances have the potential to motivate 
violence. Therefore, I control for grievances in the empirical analysis. Economic grievance, 
cultural grievance, and political grievance data are taken from the MAROB data. Economic 
grievance is an ordinal measure for the dominant economic grievance; zero denotes that there is 
no expressed economic grievance; one means that eliminating economic discrimination is a 
major goal, and two means that the organization focuses on creating or strengthening remedial 
policies. Cultural grievances are also measured by an ordinal variable with three categories. All 
of the ethno-political organizations included in the MAROB dataset have some sort of political 
grievances, which make it hard to test the impact of political grievances. The dominant political 
grievance of the organization in the original MAROB data is coded as the following: 
1.  Major organizational goals focused on eliminating discrimination 
2. Major organizational goals focused on creating or increasing remedial policies 
3. Major organizational goals focused on creating or strengthening autonomous status for 
group 
4. Major organizational goals focused on creating a separate state for the group or 
revanchist change in border of state 
5. -88 Other  
There are 703 (out of 1775) observations in the other category with text description of 
these grievances such as “Palestinian independence”, “Establishing an Islamist state”, “regime 
change” etc. To avoid dropping 703 observations in the other category, a close reading of each 
case description was done by the author and each of the independence movements was coded as 
a four. In other words, a dichotomous variable, which takes the value of one for independence or 




gaining independence and/or establishing a separate state are expected to be more violence-
prone. Alternatively, I create another dummy for only separationist organizations by coding 
category number four above as one (it is called autonomy in the regressions below).  
The variables that measure external support for organization and organizational 
popularity are included to test the resource mobilization theory. An organization’s ability to 
mobilize people and engage in collective action depends on existence of external and internal 
support for the organization. To measure external support for the organization, four dummy 
variables from the MAROB data are used. The organizations that received support (financial 
support, human support, or political support) from diasporas, from foreign states, from 
international governmental organizations, from international non-governmental organizations, or 
from other non-state actors are coded as one. There is an ordinal variable (ranges from 1 to 3) 
that measures organizational popularity among the group that the organization represents. I 
create a dichotomous variable for highly popular, dominant organizations17 to test the impact of 
domestic support.  
I use two dichotomous variables from MAROB data, which measure intra-group 
competition, in order to test the impact of organizational structure (the theory of out-bidding). 
There is a dichotomous variable coded as one if there is an organizational split during the year of 
observation. I also create a dummy for organizations with factionalized/competing leaders by 
using the leadership type variable in MAROB data. Ethno-political organizations that are 
fractionalized and/or have a weak/competing leadership are expected to be more violence-prone. 
I use two variables to control for religion. There is a dichotomous variable which is coded as one 
for organizations that have a religious ideology.  For robustness, and to test the impact of 
                                                 
17 A dummy variable is preferred since the use of an ordinal variable leads to multicollinearity problem. Also, 87.9% 
of all observations are in the middle category (number 2) which suggests that most of the organizations have some 




Islamist ideology specifically, I create a dummy variable for organizations that focus on 
establishing an Islamist state by using the text description found in the other political grievances 
category.  
Finally, I control for economic development and organizations that are active in Israel. 
Israel is an outlier in the Middle East; it is a democratic, wealthy country with a long history of 
conflict with the Palestinians. I use annual GDP per capita growth rate to control for economic 
development. Purchasing power parity converted GDP per capita (constant in 2005 international 
dollars) data come from The Penn World Tables. Table 3.2 summarizes the list of variables used 
in the empirical analysis and how the concepts are operationalized whereas Table 3.3 
summarizes descriptive statistics of variables. 
Table 3.2 and 3.3 about here 
E.  Findings 
In Model 1, I include annual GDP per capita growth rate, a dummy for democracy, youth bulges, 
state repression, organizational popularity, external support, high political grievances, economic 
grievances, cultural grievances, a dummy for organizations that have a religious ideology, and a 
dummy for organizations located in Israel. Youth bulge is positive and significant, which 
supports my hypothesis. State repression positively affects the likelihood of adopting violent 
strategies by ethno-political organizations, whereas democracy is insignificant; these findings 
indicate that there is partial support for political opportunity structure argument. However, 
caution is warranted in interpreting the insignificance of regime type; the analysis is limited to 
the Middle East, which is predominantly non-democratic. There is not enough variation in this 




Economic grievances increase the probability of use of violent strategies. Interestingly, 
the high political grievance dummy is insignificant; organizations that focus on gaining 
independence or establishing a separate state are no more violence-prone than others. Therefore, 
the relative deprivation argument is partially supported. Likewise, there is partial support for the 
resource mobilization argument; external support is positive and significant but organizational 
popularity−which intends to proxy domestic support for organization−is insignificant. The Israeli 
dummy is positive and significant; ethno-political organizations that are active in Israel are 
indeed more violence-prone. Religious ideology is not statistically significant whereas increasing 
GDP growth rate has a pacifying effect.  
In model 2, I drop the high political grievance dummy and replace it with an autonomy 
dummy which is coded as one for separationist organizations (4th category of the dominant 
political grievance variable in the original data). While autonomy is insignificant, like high 
political grievance, impact of all other variables is similar to the previous model. In Model 3, I 
drop the religious ideology dummy and replace it with a dummy for organizations that focus on 
creating an Islamist state as a robustness check. Like religious ideology, an Islamist state dummy 
is insignificant; there is no support for the argument that religious or Islamist organizations are 
more violence-prone than non-religious ones.  
I add organizational split and weak leadership dummies in Models 4 and 5 respectively18 
to examine the impact of organizational structure. According to the theory of out-bidding, both 
inter-group and intra-group competition cause more radicalization, thus increase the probability 
of violent strategies. I can only examine the impact of intra-group competition since there is no 
                                                 
18 I added these two variables separately since they intend to measure the same concepts: intra-group competition 




variable that measures inter-group competition in the MAROB dataset.19 I use organizational 
split and leadership type (weak/competing leaders indicate existence of intra-group competition) 
to proxy intra-group competition. The findings indicate that fractionalized organizations and 
organizations with competing/weak leadership are indeed more violence-prone than other ethno-
political organizations. Youth bulge is positive and significant in Model 4 and Model 5, like in 
previous models; one can conclude that the significance of youth bulge is robust to alternative 
model specifications.  
While the empirical analysis above confirms that youth bulges foster violence, exploring 
the underlying causal mechanisms of youth-violence relationship and mediating variables is 
another interesting research question. Those scholars who argue that youth bulges are more 
prone to violence generally argue that such violence-proneness is conditional on other socio-
economic and political factors. High unemployment rate, state repression and autocracy are 
among the commonly cited factors that act like a catalyst between violence and youth bulges. I 
interact autocracy and youth bulges and democracy and youth bulges in Model 6 and Model 7, 
respectively to see if the existence of youth bulges creates more problems in autocracies. The 
interaction of youth bulge and autocracy is positive and significant, whereas the youth-
democracy interaction is insignificant. This finding suggests that youth bulges in autocratic 
regimes tend to be more violence-prone than youth bulges in democratic regimes. Young people 
in democracies can express their frustration/dissatisfaction through nonviolent means, whereas 
such conventional strategies usually do not exist in autocracies, which makes resorting to 
violence the only viable option. The graph in Figure 3.1 show the predicted probability of 
violence for changing values of youth bulges in autocratic and other (non-autocratic) countries. 
                                                 
19 The dataset includes a dichotomous variable which is coded 1 if there is an inter-organizational conflict.  I did not 
use this variable since it measures conflict rather than competition. Inter-organizational conflict is correlated with 




While the predicted probability of violence is higher in non-autocratic countries for low values of 
youth bulges, autocratic countries face a greater risk of violence when the proportion of young 
males exceeds about 38%. The higher risk of violence in non-autocratic countries may be 
because of inclusion of both democracies and anocracies in this category. As visually seen in the 
graph, the substantive impact of youth bulges in increasing risk of violence is higher in autocratic 
countries compared to other countries. 
Figure 3.1 about here 
I also interact youth bulges with state repression, negative GDP growth rate,20 economic 
grievances, and Islamist ideology in order to find out whether youth bulges foster violence when 
coupled with any of these factors. I add these interacted variables one at a time to the model. 
None of the interactions was significant.21 I suspect that the insignificance of the interaction 
terms might be due to the use of crude proxies to measure the theoretically relevant concepts or 
alternatively limitations in the structure of the data. For example, economic grievance is an 
ordinal variable with only three categories whereas repression is a dichotomous variable. 
Overall, while the empirical analysis above suggests that the existence of youth bulges in general 
increases likelihood of political violence at group-level, the insignificance of most of the 
interaction terms is a theoretical puzzle that requires further research. Table 3.4 summarizes the 
regression analysis. 
Table 3.4 about here 
Finally, I calculate the predicted probabilities to show the substantive importance of the 
explanatory variables by using Models 4, 5, and 6. The predicted probability of an organizations’ 
use of violence is 5.7% when all continuous variables are held at their mean values and dummy 
                                                 
20 I do not have the unemployment data. Therefore, negative GDP growth rate is used to test whether impact of 
youth bulges is conditional on economic development. 




variables are set to 0. The graph in Figure 3.2 shows the changes in predicted probability of use 
of violence by ethno-political organizations as the proportion of youth bulges shifts from its 
minimum value to maximum value. The probability of use of violence increases from 2% to 10% 
as the proportion of young males shifts from 21% to about 40%. In other words, the probability 
of use of violence by ethno-political organizations increases by 400%.  
Figure 3.2 about here 
The probability of use of violence increases from 5.7% to 13% when repression shifts 
from 0 to 1 while all continuous variables are held at their mean values and dummy variables are 
set to 0. In other words, the predicted probability of use of violence increases by 131%. 
Similarly, the probability of violence increases 100% when the weak leadership dummy shifts 
from 0 to 1. Shifting external support from 0 to 1 also leads to a 115% increase in the probability 
of violence. A shift in economic grievance from the lowest to highest value (0 to 2) leads to a 
191% increase in the probability of violence. The impact of GDP growth rate is relatively small; 
shifting GDP growth rate from 10th to 90th percentile leads to only a 20% decline in the 
probability of violence. Shifting organizational split dummy from 0 to 1 leads to 188% increase 
in the dependent variable. Lastly, a shift in youth*autocracy interaction from 0 to 0.39 (90th 
percentile of youth bulge) leads to a 78% increase in the probability of violence. 
  All in all, these findings indicate that youth bulges, economic grievances, external 
support for organization, state repression, organizational split, and fractionalized leadership all 
increase probability of use of violent strategies by ethno-political organizations whereas 
increasing GDP growth rate has a negative impact. Youth bulges especially foster violence in 






In December 2010, a Tunisian vegetable peddler burned himself to death after his cart is 
confiscated by a policewoman. This incident created a spillover effect of protests in many 
Middle Eastern countries, and initiated the Arab Spring.22 Some scholars describe the recent 
uprisings in the Middle East as youth revolutions; those young people, dissatisfied with their 
oppressive regimes and frustrated with unemployment, rebelled against their governments 
(Hoffman and Jamal 2012; Mohammed 2011). The findings of this chapter supports the 
argument that existence of youth bulges in the Middle East increase the risk of resorting to 
violence by ethno-political organizations.  
In addition to youth bulges, other internal and external factors also influence decision to 
resort to violence by organizations. Economic grievances and state repression foster violence 
whereas increasing GDP growth rate has a negative impact. While political grievances are found 
to be insignificant; one needs to be cautious while interpreting this finding. All of the 
organizations included in the MAROB dataset have political grievances, which makes it hard to 
explore role of political grievances. Organizational factors such as fractionalization and 
competing leadership increase likelihood of resorting to violence, which confirms the theory of 
outbidding. External support for the organization has a positive impact, whereas domestic 
support (measured by organizational popularity) is insignificant; there is partial support for 
resource mobilization theory. Religious/Islamist ideology is insignificant in all of the models; 
there is no support for the argument that religious organizations are more violence-prone than 
others. 







In conclusion, two observations stand out. First, socio-economic and political factors 
such as youth bulge, economic development, and state repression, as well as internal factors such 
as organizational structure are crucial in the decision to resort to violence whereas religious 
ideology does not seem to be a driving force.  Second, these findings are consistent with the 
findings of the previous chapter; religious ideology does not seem to make countries more or less 
conflict prone once we control for socio-economic and political conditions that increase risk of 
domestic armed conflict. Among all of the variables tested in this chapter and in the previous 
chapter, state repression and economic grievances are significant in most of the regressions, 
which suggests that violence is largely driven by socio-economic and political conditions. 
Finally, it is important to note some of the limitations of this research. The analysis is 
limited to only sixteen countries that are located in MENA region, which introduces a selection 
bias problem and prevents making broader generalizations. The analysis is limited to MENA due 
to limitations in data availability.  Future research may test the generalizability of these findings 
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Appendix 1: List of Tables 






























repression Israel democracy GDP 
growth
organizational split 1
economic grievance 0.0192 1
cultural grievance 0.0383 0.3631 1
religious ideology 0.0283 -0.0792 0.418 1
youth bulge 0.0542 0.0779 0.313 0.0322 1
external support 0.0012 0.0514 -0.002 0.068 -0.081 1
Islamist ideology 0.0244 -0.0527 0.4417 0.4848 0.1183 -0.0843 1
repression 0.0187 0.3888 0.2748 0.032 0.145 0.201 0.0486 1
Israel
-0.0027 -0.0357 -0.228 -0.0179 -0.4689 -0.0975 -0.1131 0.053 1
democracy -0.0339 -0.1182 -0.3391 -0.1216 -0.6788 0.0485 -0.0137 -0.0687 0.4375 1
GDP growth 0.0338 -0.0056 -0.0109 -0.0147 0.0008 0.0241 -0.0118 0.0487 0.0055 0.0055 1




Table 3.2: Summary of Variables  
Variable Name                                            Concept 
Youth bulge Demographic character 
Annual GDP per capita growth rate (%) Economic development  
Repression  Political Opportunity Structure 
Organizational popularity Domestic support (resource mobilization) 
External support External support (resource mobilization) 
Religious ideology Religion  
Islamist ideology 




Organizations that aim to create an Islamist state 




Democracy  Political Opportunity Structure 
Organizational split Organizational structure (resource mobilization) 
Weak leadership Organizational structure (resource mobilization) 





















Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics  
Variables Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min Max 
Annual GDP growth rate (%) 0.012 0.181 -0.648 0.605 
Youth bulges . 31 0.057 0.20 0.41 
Repression 0.131 0.337 0 881 
Polity 2 −0.49 7.91 -10 10 
Prop. of young males 0.31 0.057 0.206 0.411 
Organizational popularity 2.02 0.461 1 3 
External support 0.411 0.492 0 1 
Leadership Type 3.1 0.754 1 4 
Religious ideology 0.233 0.423 0 1 
Islamist ideology .072 0.259 0 1 
High Political Grievance 0.386 0.487 0 1 
Economic Grievance 0.258 0.617 0 2 
Cultural Grievance 0.562 0.857 0 2 
Autonomy 0.186 0.389 0 1 
Autocracy 0.325 0.468 0 1 
Democracy 0.485 0.499 0 1 
Organizational split 0.029 0.168 0 1 
















Table 3.4: Logistic Regression on Use of Violence by Ethno-political Organizations (1980-2004) 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Repression  .886*** .885*** .865*** .903*** .897*** .934*** .897*** 
 (.268) (.267) (.269) (.262) (.262) (.27) (.262) 
Youth bulge 7.474*** 7.497*** 7.554*** 7.126*** 7.306*** 3.46 7.628*** 
 (2.461) (2.466) (2.465) (2.549) (2.5) (3.17) (2.75) 
GDP growth  -.980*** -.967** -.973** -.991*** -1.026*** -1.059*** -1.028*** 
 
(.378) (.379) (.382) (.382) (.385) (.385) (.384) 
Religious ideology .324 .335  .328 .335  .349          .334 
 (.334) (.341)  (.343) (.340) (.358) (.34) 
Islamist ideology   .175     
   (.456)     
Economic grievance .570*** .585*** .518** .591*** .579*** .609*** .579*** 
 (.208) (.209) (.209) (.208) (.21) (.214) (.21) 
Cultural grievance -.137 -.117 -.03 -.03 -.119 -.095 -.118 
 (.163) (.163) (.15) (.164) (.161) (.163) (.161) 
High political grievance -.146       
 (.271)       
Autonomy  -.053 -.083 -.082 -.069 -.033 -.072 
  (.280) (.281) (.292) (.278) (.269) (.28) 
External support .906*** .877*** .936*** .854*** .883*** .854*** .882*** 
 (.233) (.207) (.216) (.208) (.204) (.2) (.204) 
Organizational popularity  .360 .359 .335 .369 .375 .41 .38 
 (.289) (.291) (.282) (.282) (.283) (.272) (.283) 
Democracy .207 .194 .198 .155 .186  .474 
 (.256) (.259) (.262) (.26) (.259)  (1.486) 
Autocracy      -4.413**  
      (1.72)  
Organizational split     1.171*** 1.217*** 1.173*** 
     (.37) (.371) (.371) 
Weak leadership    .722*    
    (.369)    
Youth*autocracy      11.584**  
      (4.6)  
Youth*democracy       -.891 
       (4.679) 
Israel .670** .685* .772** .704** .721** .461 .696* 
 
(.331) (.358) (.349) (.361) (.359) (.381) (.379) 
Peace years -1.560*** -1.560*** -1.573*** -1.557*** -1.558*** -1.546*** -1.558*** 
 
(.182) (.183) (.186) (.185) (.183) (.183) (.183) 
Peace years
2
 .199*** .199*** .201*** .2*** .199*** .197*** .197*** 
 (.045) (.045) (.046) (.046) (.045) (.045) (.045) 
Peace years
3
 -.007*** -.007*** -.007*** -.007*** -.007*** -.007*** -.007*** 
 (.003) (.002) (.002) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) 
N 1649 1649 1649 1649 1644 1644 1644 
 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks (*, **, ***) indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, 




Table 3.5: Alternative Model Specifications  
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Repression  3.587** .854*** .895*** .876*** 
 (1.814) (.272) (.261) (.262) 
Youth bulge 8.092*** 6.514** 7.4*** 7.521*** 
 (2.447) (2.55) (2.5) (2.6) 
GDP growth  -.995*** -1.032***  -1.032*** 
 (.374) (.388)  (.389) 
Negative  GDP growth   -2.362  
   (4.23)  
Religious ideology .318 .440 .332  
 (.346) (.346) (.34)  
Islamist ideology    .741 
    (3.292) 
Economic grievance .606*** -1.31 .579*** .507** 
 (.215) (1.589) (.209) (.209) 
Cultural grievance -.109 -.165 -.118 -.031 
 (.161) (.171) (.161) (.152) 
Autonomy -.089 -.159 -.076 -.101 
 (.271) (.275) (.279) (.28) 
External support .892*** .886*** .883*** .943*** 
 (.207) (.206) (.205) (.215) 
Organizational popularity  .360 .359 .371 .349 
 (.287) (.285) (.282) (.274) 
Democracy .178 .207 .184 .183 
 (.258) (.259) (.258) (.261) 
Organizational split 1.173*** 1.228***  1.168*** 
 (.367) (.372)  (.371) 
Youth*Repression -8.034    
 (5.33)    
Youth* Negative GDP growth   9.244  
   (11.66)  
Youth* Economic grievance  5.8   
  (4.663)   
Youth*Islamist ideology    -1.668 
    (8.751) 
Israel .677* .758** .722** .826** 
 (.361) (.346) (.359) (.353) 
Peace years -1.565*** -1.543*** -1.559*** -1.571*** 
 (.184) (.182) (.186) (.186) 
Peace years2 .198*** .196*** .198*** .2*** 
 (.045) (.045) (.045) (.046) 
Peace years3 -.007*** -.008*** -.007*** -.007*** 
 (.003) (.003) (.002) (.002) 
N 1644 1644 1644 1644 
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Appendix 3: Description of Variables (From MAROB codebook) 
Dependent Variable: 
DOMORGVIOLENCE: To what degree is the organization using violence domestically as a 
strategy?  
0 Organization is not using violence as a strategy 
1 Organization is using violence as occasional strategy but is not specifically targeting persons.  
2 Organization is using violence regularly as a strategy but is targeting security personnel 
(including state security personnel and nonstate armed militias) and not government nonsecurity 
personnel or civilians 
3 Organization is using violence regularly as a strategy but is targeting security personnel 
(including state security personnel and nonstate armed militias) and/or government nonsecurity 
personnel, but not civilians 
4 Organization is occasionally targeting civilians but most of its violent acts target security 
5 Organization is targeting civilians regularly 
TRANSVIOLTARG: To what degree is the organization using violence to target transnational 
entities as a strategy? (The classification is the same as domorgviolence, ranges from 0 to 5) 
Independent Variables: 
ORGPOLGR Dominant political grievance of the organization 
Value Label 
1 Major organizational goals focused on eliminating discrimination 
2 Major organizational goals focused on creating or increasing remedial policies 




4 Major organizational goals focused on creating a separate state for the group or revanchist 
change in border of state 
-88 Other: goal described in ORGPOLGRDES 
-99 Missing Value/No basis for judgment 
ORGECGR Dominant economic grievance of the organization 
Value Label 
0 No expressed economic grievances 
1 Economic grievances focused on elimination of discrimination 
2 Economic grievances focused on creating or strengthening economic remedial policies 
-99 Missing Value/No basis for judgment 
ORGCULTGR Code the dominant cultural grievance of the organization 
Value Label 
0 No expressed cultural grievances 
1 Cultural grievances focused on elimination of discrimination 
2 Cultural grievances focused on creating or strengthening economic remedial policies (i.e., 
establishing or increasing state funding for cultural protection and/or promotion) 
-99 Missing Value/No basis for judgment 
ORGSPLIT Did the organization split this year? 
Value Label 







LEAD Type of leadership for organization 
Value Label 
1 Factionalized/competing leaders 
2 Weak or decentralized leadership 
3 Strong ruling council 
4 Strong single leader 
-99 Missing Value/No basis for judgment 
ORGPOP Popularity of organization 
Value Label 
1 Fringe- no evidence of support from group 
2 One of several organizations with support from group 
3 Dominant organization 
-99 Missing Value/No basis for judgment 
RELORG Does the organization advocate policies that incorporate religion into 
public life? 
Value Label 
0 No (non-religious) 
1 Yes 
-99 Missing Value/No basis for judgment 







-99 Missing Value/No basis for judgment 




-99 Missing Value/No basis for judgment 





-99 Missing Value/No basis for judgment 
INGOSUP Has org. received support from international non-governmental organization or other 




-99 Missing Value/No basis for judgment 
STATEVIOLENCE 





1- State is not using lethal violence against the organization 
2- State is using periodic lethal violence against the organization 







































































                                                 
23 Some portions of this article have previously been published in July 2012 issue of Democratization with my co-






 While exploring the conditions which foster political violence and radicalism is an interesting 
and important research question, the process of de-radicalization and moderation of Islamist 
parties is also equally important which remains underexplored. In this respect, exploring the 
evolution of radical Islamist parties (moderation process) will yield important clues to better 
understand democratization in the Muslim world and formulate more cohesive policies in the 
wake of the “Arab Spring.” What forms do Islamist moderation take, and which factors underlie 
each form of moderation? By building on the findings of Communist moderation literature, this 
chapter introduces a two-stage framework to explain variation in Islamist party moderation over 
time and across space: tactical vs. ideological moderation. Tactical moderation refers to the kind 
of moderation where radical parties make a decision on whether to accept electoral democracy 
(rather than violent strategies) as a means to achieve ideological goals without compromising 
their platforms. Structural factors such as political liberalization, international factors and state 
repression are causes of tactical moderation. Ideological moderation pertains to shifts in a 
platform from a radical niche to more moderate lines to respond to societal changes (economic 
liberalization, economic growth, generational changes, electoral loss and changing voter 
preferences) to gain greater popular support. Empirically, I analyze the Italian Communist Party, 
the Party for Justice and Development in Morocco, the Welfare Party, The Justice and 
Development Party, the Felicity Party in Turkey, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Wasat Party in 
Egypt, the Hamas in Gaza strip, and the Islamic Action Front in Jordan. In providing evidence 
through structured comparisons and field interviews, this chapter develops a generalizable theory 

















While exploring the conditions which foster political violence and radicalism is an interesting 
and important research question, the process of de-radicalization and moderation of Islamist 
parties is also equally important, which remains underexplored. The militant Islamist groups 
receive disproportional media coverage, whereas the voices of those nonviolent or mainstream 
organizations such as moderate political parties are hardly heard. When Islamist parties issue 
statements, which emphasize commitment to democracy or respect for rule of law, their ‘true’ 
intentions are usually questioned. More specifically, there are theoretical debates about whether 
Islam and democracy can coexist or not, and whether political parties with an Islamist ideology 
can contribute to democratization or not, which is somehow similar to the debates about whether 
Islam promotes violence or not. I explored driving forces of violence and radicalism in the 
previous chapters. This chapter builds on the previous chapters by examining a reverse trend: de-
radicalization and the moderation of Islamist parties.  
While the debates about whether Islam and democracy can coexist or not continue, 
support for Islamic-oriented political parties has increased considerably since the 1980s. 
Attempts by Islamic parties to participate in political systems in semi-democratic Muslim 
societies are crucial in understanding the democratic consolidation of these countries. On the one 
hand, some scholars and policy makers contend that Islamist parties’ participation should be 
viewed with caution since they might have the hidden agenda of changing the regime and 
establishing an Islamic state once they come to power. Schwedler (1998) calls this possibility 
‘the paradox of democracy’; the idea that democratic processes might empower nondemocratic 
actors. Yet, there is no historical case supporting a hidden agenda argument. On the other hand, 




democratic consolidation (Nasr 2005; Schwedler, 2006; Wickham 2004). Indeed, there is a 
growing trend of shifting from ideology-oriented policies to moderate pragmatic policies among 
Islamic oriented parties and growing support for these moderate Islamic parties (Nasr, 2005). 
Moderation appears to have emerged as a key term in discussions about Islamists and 
Islamist political participation in the Muslim world, as Schwedler (2007) duly notes. That 
violence, radicalism, and opposition to democracy are increasingly viewed as illegitimate means 
for political participation led many Islamists to reframe their political discourse accordingly. 
This trend has been most visible within the context of the Arab Spring in the Middle East. 
However, there exists great variation—both among Islamists and others—as to what the notion 
of moderation refers. Moderation, hence, has become a catch-all term.   
In popular discourse, virtually every Islamist group either has a claim on moderation, or 
is being cast as an example of moderation. Examples include the Party for Justice and 
Development in Morocco (PJD), 24  the Islamic Action Front in Jordan, 25  the Yemeni Islah 
Party,26  the Algerian Islah Party,27  the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP),28  the 
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood,29 Al-Nahda in Tunisia,30 the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood,31 and 
                                                 
24 “Don't Hang the Barber,” Economist, July 24, 2003; Khadija Finan, “Western Sahara Impasse,” Le Monde 
Diplomatique, January 11, 2006; “Islamists Slip in Moroccan Elections,” Christian Science Monitor, September 10, 
2007; “Morocco: Islamists Divided, Jihadists Contained, Monarchy Secure,” Stratfor Report, September 7, 2007. 
25 “Jordan Questions Dozens Over Amman Bombings,” ABC News Online, November 12, 2005 
(http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200511/s1505087.htm - accessed January 30, 2011); Clark 2006. 
26 “Yemen Pursuing Terror Its Own Way; Tactics, Results Vary, But Target Is Al Qaeda,” The Washington Post, 
October 17, 2002. 
27 “Algerian Leader Eyes Poll Victory,” BBC, April 7, 2004 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3607603.stm - 
accessed January 30, 2011). 
28 “Turkey: Post-Islamists in Power,” Le Monde Diplomatique, March 6, 2003.  
29 Joshua Stacher and Samer Shehata, “Hear out Muslim Brotherhood,” Boston Globe, March 25, 2007; “Egypt's 
Banned Muslim Brotherhood Wins 29 More Seats in Runoff Polls,” USA Today, November 27, 2005; Matthew 
Kaminski, “Among the Muslim Brothers: The Contradictory Faces of Political Islam in Post-Mubarak Egypt,” The 
Wall Street Journal, April 9, 2011. 
30 Mahan Abedin, “Islamist Leader Returns From Exile – An Interview with Rashid Al-Ghannoushi,” Le Monde 
Diplomatique, 31 January 2011; Gearon, Eamonn, 2011. “The ‘Real Deal’ Revolutions.” Middle East 421: 18-21; 
Olivier Roy, “The Tunisian Revolt: Where Have All the Islamists Gone?” Christian Science Monitor, January 21, 
2011 




Hamas in the Palestinian Territories.32 When groups as diverse as the Turkish AKP and Hamas 
are branded as “moderate,” the term is likely to lose much of its distinctiveness. This apparent 
lack of consensus on moderation is not limited to popular discourse. Scholarly literature also 
shows great variance as to the meaning and causes of Islamist moderation. Such variation might 
be a symptom of the different types of Islamist moderation. Hence, the question guiding this 
research is as follows: What forms do Islamist moderation take, and which factors underlie each 
form of moderation?  
From a social science perspective, the inconsistent use of the term moderation amounts to 
“conceptual stretching” implying that some attributes of the concept are eliminated in favor of 
broader applicability, which ultimately decreases the usefulness of the concept (Sartori 1970; 
Goertz 2006). This suggests a lack of progress toward a coherent and systematic approach to 
explaining Islamist moderation. A more systematic approach is thus likely to contribute to a 
better understanding of Islamist moderation in a cross-national perspective.  
Another implication is that moderation can become an instrument in ideological 
struggles; different factions may utilize the concept to gain legitimacy and sympathy from a 
broader domestic and international audience. Where moderation and democracy have become the 
currency of political discourse, it is crucial to understand what kind of moderation each party 
claims and the conditions under which such moderation comes about. 33  Finally, a better 
understanding of moderation is necessary for better policymaking especially in the wake of the 
“Arab Awakening.” That Islamist parties are key political actors in the Middle East and whether 
                                                 
32 “Hamas Represents Islamic “Current of Moderation,” Al-Arabiya TV, September 9, 2007. 
33 Moderation can also be a double-edged sword; hence, parties need to maintain a delicate balance between actual 
moderation and retaining ideological purity of the party to prevent credibility problems and not to alienate core 




Islamist parties moderate or not—or, to what extent they moderate—may shape the course of 
transitions in the region. 
In this chapter, I analyze Islamist moderation to identify the different forms it takes and 
to explain how each kind of moderation comes about. To this end, I present a preliminary 
systematic framework, arguing that moderation of Islamist parties takes on two complementary 
forms. The first form of moderation is marked by a change in strategy. Islamist parties choose to 
participate in the formal political structure (rather than use of violent tactics) by renouncing their 
original stance, i.e., that the formal political structure is irrelevant to their ultimate goal of an 
Islamic state. All of this is done, however, without compromising their core ideology. Such 
limited engagement implies that Islamists will work within the procedural rules of an electoral 
game, yet the end-goal remains the same—replacement of the existing system with an Islamic 
one. Hence, Islamist parties shift from use of violent strategies to nonviolent electoral 
participation and have a strong conviction that they can attain the ultimate goal via popular 
support, which leads the ideological platform to remain largely unchanged, and Islamist parties 
to remain policy-seeking parties. I call this process tactical moderation.34  
Some Islamist parties, however, go further and overhaul major elements of their ideology 
in favor of more centrist positions. Specifically, these parties change their ideological positions 
on democracy, the economic system, and the political role of Islam. This shift is a clear 
indication that the party has moved toward becoming a vote-seeking party rather than a policy-
seeking one. I call this second kind of moderation ideological moderation. The causal factors 
that motivate each type of moderation differ from each other. While the tactical moderation is 
largely driven by structural factors (e.g., political liberalization, international factors, failure of 
                                                 
34 The term “tactical moderation” is previously used in different contexts such as Spanish Communist Party, PSOE, 
(Share 1985) and the British Labor Party (Barker 1973). The use of the term for Islamist groups did not occur until 




non-democratic paths to achieve ideological goals and regime repression), societal factors, such 
as socioeconomic changes, electoral participation, and intra-party dynamics, motivate ideological 
moderation.  
The theory developed in this chapter rests in part on the findings of the Communist 
moderation literature, and more broadly on party moderation. The motivation for reliance on 
Western Communist party moderation literature is twofold. Theoretically, the literature on 
Communist moderation presents a coherent conceptual framework with which to analyze 
Islamist moderation. Secondly, and more conceptually, a crossover from Communist moderation 
to Islamist moderation points to a key categorical similarity between Communist and Islamist 
parties. Both kinds of parties are anti-system parties; that is to say both, ideally, want to replace 
the current political, economic and social system with one that is in line with their ideological 
commitments.  
Empirically, I analyze The Italian Communist Party (PCI) and the Moroccan Party for 
Justice and Development (PJD) in a comparative perspective. I also examine several other cases 
of moderation in the Middle East and I apply the theoretical framework developed in this chapter 
to these cases. The PCI has been one of the most radical, yet simultaneously one of the most 
influential and successful working-class parties in Western Europe in the 20th century. Hence the 
PCI case offers insights into the moderation of Western Communist parties. For its part, the PCI 
helps to substantiate the theoretical argument as I build on the Communist moderation literature 
to analyze Islamist moderation. The analysis relies on secondary literature, and aims to offer a 
comparative perspective on Islamist moderation. The analysis of the PJD relies on interviews 
with party officials in Morocco, and primary sources, i.e., party publications. The PJD’s 




the whole spectrum of moderation from extreme radicalism in the 1970s to a mainstream Muslim 
democratic platform in the 21st century, and allows observing both kinds of moderation in a 
single case.  
This chapter is organized into five sections. First, I review the literature on Islamist 
moderation and identify distinct hypotheses of Islamist moderation. Then, I present a succinct 
review of the Western Communist party moderation literature, and introduce the theoretical 
framework for analyzing Islamist moderation based on this literature. In this, I utilize the 
moderation of the Italian PCI to demonstrate the framework. In the third section I analyze the 
Moroccan PJD. The fourth section briefly reviews various cases of Islamist moderation in 
different countries and examines how well each case of moderation fits to the theory of Islamist 
moderation developed in this chapter. The final section summarizes the findings and discusses 
the implications of the analysis.  
C. Islamist Moderation in the Literature 
There exists a wide range of arguments on what constitutes Islamist moderation and the causal 
factors leading to moderation. The inclusion-moderation hypothesis is one of the most important 
arguments on Islamist moderation (Brooks 2002; Brumberg 2002; Willis 2004; Schwedler 2006, 
2007 and 2011; Wickham 2004; Tezcur 2010), and on party moderation more broadly (Tilly 
1978; Kitschelt 1986; Przeworski and Sprague 1986; Tarrow 1994; Bermeo 1997). Islamist 
parties’ inclusion in the formal political structure (such as elections) is highlighted as the leading 
cause of moderation because it leads Islamist parties to recognize the constraints of a formal 
system, and to moderate as a result. On the other hand, exclusive regimes lead to radicalization 
and legitimate the use of violence, as discussed in previous chapters (Hafez 2003). In a recent 




to date. Schwedler, essentially, distinguishes three discrete arguments within the body of this 
argument: ideological moderation of parties, of individuals, and behavioral moderation.  
Others have suggested variants of the inclusion-moderation hypothesis. Wickham (2004) 
uses a combination of inclusion-moderation and social learning hypotheses to explain the 
emergence of the Wasat Party in Egypt, emphasizing middle generation Islamist leaders’ 
interactions with people from “other” convictions and ideologies as a key factor in their 
moderation. Cavatorta (2006) and Yilmaz (2009) also emphasize social learning in other 
contexts. In a similar way, electoral participation is viewed as a key cause of moderation and 
democratization (El-Ghobashy 2005; McFaul and Wittes 2008; Hovdenak 2009).  
Clark, however, challenges the inclusion-moderation hypothesis by arguing that any 
meaningful cross-ideological cooperation—as an observable implication of moderation—
requires a “spirit” of compromise and an intra-organizational discussion of compromise (2006, 
542). For Clark, inclusion/participation in a formal political structure of multiple ideological 
stripes is not sufficient to bring about moderation; moderation on the part of the Islamist party 
(IAF) must come first for cooperation and compromise to emerge. Yet, Robinson (1997) argues 
that Jordanian IAF’s moderation—as evidenced by its support for the democratic opening in 
Jordan in the late 1980s—emanated out of self-interest. For Robinson, IAF’s decision to support 
political liberalization then was not because the group was made up of “Jeffersonian democrats” 
but because the group had a genuine “organizational interest” in liberalization.   
Underscoring institutional factors, Wegner and Pellicer (2009) argue that the nature of 
the relationship between the Islamic party and the Islamic movement the party hails from is a key 
dynamic of moderation. For moderation to emerge the Islamic party should be sufficiently 




PJD in Morocco, the party turned out to be more moderate because it set up its own mobilization 
resources, and the party organization was institutionalized distinctly from the Islamic movement. 
The strategic interaction hypothesis highlights Islamist parties’ interactions with secular 
governments and military as a determinant of Islamist moderation. The credibility of signals sent 
by the moderating party is deemed to be crucial in convincing the state and others that the party’s 
moderation is not a “Trojan horse.” The costliness of the signal is a factor contributing to the 
credibility of moderation (Kalyvas 2000). In a variant, state-military repression of Islamist 
groups  (such as deprivation of freedoms of assembly and religious practice, arbitrary detentions 
and imprisonment) forces Islamists to moderate their ideological stance on various issues in 
order to ensure survival (Mecham 2004; Ozbudun 2006; Somer 2007; Cizre ed. 2009). However, 
repression also has the potential to foster radicalization and violence, as discussed in previous 
chapters. Ashour (2009:139) points out that “repressive autocrats breed violent theocrats”. For 
example, state repression has led to moderation of Islamist parties in Turkey whereas repression 
led to radicalization of the Algerian FIS.  
Finally, some scholars offered socioeconomic explanations for Islamist moderation. 
Typically, the analogy is to Moore’s (1966) emphasis on the bourgeoisie’s role in bringing 
democracy. The size of the middle class directly correlates with the moderation and democratic 
disposition of the country in general (Demiralp 2009; Gulalp 2001; Gumuscu 2010; Langohr 
2002; Lipset 1994; Nasr 2005 and 2009; Salame 1994; Yavuz 2009; Zakaria 2004). Some make 
the link between a stronger middle class and Islamist moderation more explicit (Nasr 2005 and 
2009), while others emphasize economic liberalization’s potential to create a business group with 




Table 1 summarizes key arguments regarding Islamist moderation. Overall, the literature 
on Islamist moderation is expansive, yet little agreement exists. Two interrelated problems stand 
in the way of a generalizable theory of Islamist moderation: 1) how moderation is defined, and 2) 
the large degree of variance of moderation across different studies. While one analysis considers 
it sufficient for a party to participate in elections for moderation to occur (Robinson 1997), 
another account might find it insufficient because the adoption of democratic ideals and 
pluralism is deemed to be a more critical signal of moderation (El-Ghobashy 2005). Hence, 
moderation takes on different meanings suggesting that there may be different kinds of 
moderation. Second, the multitude of processes and competing explanations on moderation—i.e., 
inclusion, participation, organizational interest, party autonomy, social learning, socioeconomic 
factors—imply that varying mechanisms of moderation exist. It may be the case that for one 
particular kind of moderation to emerge (i.e., giving up violence) a particular set of factors 
should exist (i.e., state repression, or political liberalization). In summary, there is no framework 
that systematically connects various explanations of moderation. Although most explanations 
deserve merit given the cases and their contexts, in the absence of a unified framework it is 
virtually impossible to reach a theory of Islamist moderation.  
D. Communist Moderation in the Literature 
In what follows I review the Communist moderation literature, and more broadly the party 
moderation literature, in order to provide a more systematic explanation to the question of 
moderation. Unlike the literature on Islamist moderation, Communist moderation literature 
presents a coherent conceptual framework by which one can analyze Islamist moderation. Both 
Communist and Islamist parties are anti-system parties; they both want to replace the current 




I argue that two distinct kinds of moderation exist in both Communist and Islamist party 
moderation: tactical moderation and ideological moderation. They differ on both the extent of 
moderation and its underlying causes.  
I define tactical moderation as the kind of moderation where anti-system parties (i.e., 
Communist or Islamist) strategically decide to embrace electoral democracy to realize their 
ideological goal of a different political, economic and social system while renouncing the use of 
violence. Democracy thus carries an instrumental value. Such moderation arises in response to 
changes in domestic institutional structure (i.e., political liberalization, economic crises), shifting 
international influence, or the failure of non-democratic paths to achieve ideological goals (Gray 
1980; Pasquino 1980; Amyot 1981; Share 1988; Waller & Fennema 1988; Ishiyama 1995; 
Gunther et al. 2004). I call these structural factors. The primary motivation behind tactical 
motivation is that by adapting to changing circumstances, anti-system parties are still convinced 
that they can fulfill their ideological goals. Hence, notwithstanding the use of democratic means, 
anti-system parties retain most of their ideology.  
Ideological moderation, in contrast, is marked by a major transformation of the central 
tenets of party ideology. For Communist parties, this translates into modified positions on 
capitalism, western alliance, and pluralist democracy. For Islamist parties, it involves embracing 
pluralist democracy, the free market, and Muslim values. Electoral dynamics underlie ideological 
moderation. Because parties want to win a greater share of votes and be more responsive to the 
electorate to prevent increasing marginalization, they moderate their ideologies. Societal factors 
(i.e., intraparty dynamics, economic liberalization, economic growth, electoral loss and changing 




(Amyot 1981; Ishiyama 1995; Share 1988 and 1999; D’Alimonte 1999; Sánchez-Cuenca 1999; 
Greene 2002; Berman 2008; Somer-Topcu 2009).35  
Communist Moderation and the Italian Communist Party 
 
Several mechanisms are offered in the scholarly literature to explain the moderation of Western 
Communist parties. While some scholars focus on intra-party dynamics, others emphasize 
electoral incentives and survival concerns. The ideological rigidity of the party (Cuenca-Sánchez 
2004), power struggles between radicals and reformists within the party, leadership change 
(Charlton 1979, Ishiyama 1995; Tucker 1967), the structure of political system (Berman 2008), 
electoral system (Ishiyama 1995; Share 1999), economic growth or crises (Berman 2008; 
Putnam 1978; Share 1988) and international factors, such as the decline of the Soviet influence 
(Amyot 1981; Sánchez-Cuenca 1999), are among the commonly cited causes of post-communist 
moderation.  
Tucker (1967) argues that a radical movement that survives for a long time without the 
opportunity to implement its objectives undergoes a deradicalization process in which initial 
deradicalization creates pressure for further deradicalization. Tucker points out four 
manifestations of the deradicalization of Marxist movements: 1) change in patterns of action, 2) 
change in strategy and tactics, 3) intra-party conflict between reformists and radicals, and 4) 
ideological deradicalization. While Tucker’s first two manifestations of deradicalization pertain 
to what I call tactical moderation, the latter two are examples of ideological moderation. 
Charlton (1979) analyzes the deradicalization of the French Communist Party (PCF) in the 1970s 
based on Tucker’s framework and argues that changes in the domestic and international 
                                                 
35 On ideological moderation, the literature suggests additional explanations. The most prominent among such 
explanations is Downs’ (1957) median voter theorem, arguing that once parties start playing the electoral game, they 
are forced to appeal to the plurality of voters, which in turn leads to broad, centrist platforms. Challenging a crucial 
assumption in the median voter theorem, others argued that ideological change in political parties reflects shifts in 




environments played an important role in the PCF’s changes in action-pattern, strategy and 
tactics. This early phase of deradicalization is cited as a major causal factor for ideological 
deradicalization; the tension between ideology and practice eventually leads to modification of 
the ideology.   
According to Cuenca-Sánchez (2004), ideological rigidity, which is affected by 
organizational reforms, generational renewal, and leadership, might prevent moderation even 
though moderation might potentially lead to electoral gains. For example, the PSOE in Spain 
decreased its vote share in 1979 and the general secretary suggested a renouncement of Marxism 
in order to gain more votes. However, 61% of PSOE delegates rejected this offer claiming that 
electoral benefits would not be worth the ideological sacrifice. Similarly, the British Labor Party 
lost all national elections between 1979 and 1997 due to its radical position, yet refused to 
moderate until the mid-1990s (Cuenca-Sánchez 2004).  
The structure of the political system is another factor which affects the likelihood of 
moderation. In weak democracies, in which governments fail to meet citizens’ demands and to 
prevent the armed struggle of communists, communist political parties remain committed to 
revolutionary tactics, whereas the existence of strong democracies and economic development 
facilitates moderation (Berman 2008). Lastly, failure of non-democratic strategies to achieve 
ideological goals in the past or in other parts of the world (Pasquino 1980), declining Soviet 
influence (Amyot 1981), and economic growth (Putnam 1978) also contributed to the 
moderation of communist parties.  
Western Communist parties’ initial experience with moderation dates back to the 1930s 
with the adoption of the Popular Front strategy. This two-stage strategy—as dictated by the 




means, also called “progressive democracy,” and then preparing the society for a socialist 
revolution (Amyot 1981). The Popular Front was a new tactic rather than a fundamental 
ideological change since Communist parties remained committed to a Marxist-Leninist ideology 
and saw democracy as instrumental for their end-goal. The key change was giving up armed 
struggle to achieve socialist revolution; hence it conforms to tactical moderation.  
Togliatti, PCI’s Secretary General between 1926 and 1964, promoted the Italian version 
of the Popular Front strategy, via italiana al socialismo  (Amyot 1981, 41). Togliatti’s gradualist 
approach to acquiring state power emphasized a parliamentary road to socialism rather than 
revolution. He eliminated the militant image of the PCI, dismissed the idea of non-collaboration 
with non-leftist groups, and tried to legitimize the PCI as a national party prioritizing Italian 
national interests (Gray 1980; Samuels 2003). Although Togliatti’s efforts constituted a key step 
in moving the PCI away from radicalism and non-participation, the change ultimately remained 
tactical. Togliatti tried to create a “partito nuovo, one open to Catholics and former fascists as 
well as doctrinally orthodox” that did not compromise the party’s core ideology (Samuels 2003). 
Although many refer to Togliatti’s pragmatic personality to explain PCI’s tactical moderation 
(Amyot 1981; Gray 1980; Pasquino 1980; Samuels 2003), external factors explain the 
transformation better. Togliatti viewed extreme leftism as risky since such experiences in the 
1920s almost destroyed the Italian left (Gray 1980). Similarly, the defeat of Communist guerillas 
in Greece (1944-1949) showed the failure of armed struggle in a world divided between two 
ideological camps (Pasquino 1980). Hence, Samuels notes, Togliatti was convinced that “the 
domestic and international balance of forces would not support a [communist] insurrection in 
any event” (2003, 303). Stronger governments of the postwar period also reinforced this 




governments unable to prevent armed struggle and ideas about a revolutionary path to 
communism (Berman 2008). 
 Beginning with the 1960s, Eurocommunism increasingly gained traction among Western 
Communist parties (Spieker 1980). It laid out the disassociation from the Soviet Union and a 
break with Leninist ideology as cornerstones of a new era (Gentili and Panebianco 1980; Waller 
and Fennema 1988). For some, Eurocommunism was a major sign of de-radicalization among 
Western Communist parties (Amyot 1981; Devlin 1979). Yet, others challenged this view as a 
vague concept, arguing that it was not clear whether Communist parties embraced democratic 
principals, or viewed them as a means to achieve Marxist ideological goals (Sánchez-Cuenca 
1999; Spieker 1980). Skepticism about Eurocommunism arose specifically because Communist 
parties still viewed a dual role for themselves, a party of both “government” and “revolution.” 
Eurocommunism’s emphasis on “organized mass movements” and their role as “the first step to 
the hidden dictatorship of the Communist party” aggravated suspicions. Eurocommunist parties 
also failed to guarantee certain basic civil rights such as freedom of organization and political 
activity, and they were vague on property rights (Spieker 1980, 442-443). Hence, 
Eurocommunism exemplified another case of tactical moderation.  
As for the PCI, Eurocommunist ideals brought the party a step closer to ideological 
moderation. With the 1964 Yalta Memorandum and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 
1968, the PCI slowly disassociated itself from the Soviet Union by emphasizing polycentrism 
(multiple roads to socialism) (Pasquino 1980). Moreover, post-war economic growth led to 
gradual changes in attitudes toward the European Economic Community (Gentili and Panebianco 
1980). Yet, similar concerns about ideological conservatism and the limits of transformation 




messages and declarations of the PCI did not favor a democratic system (Pasquino 1980, 91). 
The rank and file of the party, especially older members, remained committed to the 
revolutionary ideology (Gray 1980). Also, the party did not stray too far from the Soviet Union 
albeit with a “national emphasis” (Samuels 2003). Yet, communist parties’ moderation required 
that they sever ties with the Soviet Union (Sánchez-Cuenca 1999, 21). 
PCI’s Historic Compromise in the 1970s and the accompanying policy shifts are 
examples of ideological moderation that transformed the party from a policy-seeking one to a 
vote-seeking one. Changing socioeconomic conditions in the 1960s did not bode well for PCI in 
terms of membership or party ideology. Italy experienced economic growth in the post-war 
period, undermining PCI’s expectation for a capitalist crisis. PCI’s membership and organization 
thus weakened in this period. By the late 1960s, the PCI lost one third of its entire membership 
(Samuels 2003). International economic constraints and domestic constraints played a crucial 
role in PCI’s dramatic shift on positions regarding a NATO alliance and the European 
Community. Italy’s export-oriented postwar economic growth required integration with the 
world economy as well, especially with Western Europe and North America. Public opinion also 
favored European integration and good relations with the US. European integration was popular 
even among the Communist electorate during late 1960s and early 1970s while Communist 
leaders remained suspicious of it. These electoral incentives and PCI’s need for an alliance with 
non-Communists put pressure on the PCI leadership to moderate positions on foreign policy 
(Putnam 1978). 
The most crucial step toward ideological moderation of the Italian Communist Party 
came in 1972, largely as a result of deep socioeconomic transformation in Italian society. Enrico 




Congress. By accepting the proposal, the PCI decided to support governments led by Christian 
Democrats (DC) in return for two tangible benefits: greater legitimacy and the introduction of 
structural reforms that would include elements of socialism (D’Alimonte 1999; Gentili and 
Panebianco 1980).36 Increasing numbers of middle class youth (1968-78), who joined the party 
for positions rather than revolutionary commitment, were also influential in the historic 
compromise (Amyot 1981). Between 1976 and 1979, the PCI supported DC-led governments 
directly, or indirectly (through abstention in the Parliament). It also accepted NATO and 
European integration, key issues that would facilitate collaboration with the DC (Samuels 2003). 
Hence, key elements of the party’s communist ideology were relinquished, paving the way for 
ideological moderation. As a testament to the party’s ideological moderation, between the early 
1960s and the late 1970s, the PCI moved from the extreme left (-30) to center left (-7) in the left-
right spectrum (Manifesto Project). In the same period, the PCI virtually eliminated its statist 
discourse on the economy and instead expressed favorable views on capitalism.37 In the short 
term, PCI’s ideological moderation led to an increase in popular support, confirming the idea that 
societal changes and electoral concerns motivated PCI’s ideological moderation. The party 
increased its vote share from 27% in the early 1970s to around 35% in the mid-1970s.  
However, it is important to note that the PCI’s ideological moderation was still a work in 
progress in the 1970s. For example, according to a majority of the rank and file of the party 
members, the Historic Compromise was driven by tactical motives to eventually come to power 
(Amyot 1981).  The Historic Compromise also led to intraparty conflicts within the PCI; there 
                                                 
36 Another concern for the PCI was the possibility of a fascist union between the center and the right as exemplified 
by the 1973 military coup in Chile where a left wing government that tried to rule out Christian Democrats was 
crushed by the military (Pasquino 1980; Amyot 1981; Sassoon 1981). By accepting capitalism and democracy, the 
PCI would be able to avoid the worst outcome.  
37 On market regulation, PCI moved from over 6 points to almost 0; on nationalization, the party moved from 3 to 0; 
on planned economy, from 9 to 2. The points indicate the number of mentions in party programs; greater figures 




were different interpretations on the new policy. Even though Berlinguer argued that the 
sacrifices were needed to introduce elements of socialism in Italy, some regarded it as “a policy 
of subordination” (Sassoon 1981: 228-29). In a personal interview in 1977, Dr. Antonio Tato, 
one of the closest figures to Berlinguer, stated that: 
“Gramsci’s proletarian hegemony has not been abandoned by the PCI. The hegemony is 
not the hegemony of a party but of a class. The Historic Compromise will provide the 
transition period to the new hegemony, and the means by which the DC in particular 
accepts the new force (proletarian class) politically as the dominant trend in Italy” 
(Rusceo 1982: 114).  
The rise of left wing terrorism and Red Brigades’ kidnapping of DC leader Moro eventually 
led to the PCI’s withdrawal from the DC led government in 1979 (Sassoon 1981). The PCI 
continued its moderation later throughout the 1980s making the policy of “democratic 
alternative” a key element of its platform in the 1980s. Yet, the PCI continued to be criticized by 
major portions of Italian society on various grounds, including a lack of internal democracy, 
commitment to vestiges of Marxism-Leninism, and a relative lack of commitment to Italy’s 
international alliances (Daniels 1987). As a result, the PCI was left politically isolated. While 
some blamed the PCI’s Historic Compromise for its declining popularity, others referred to left 
wing revolutionary terrorist episodes that were prevalent in the 1970s. Even though the PCI 
condemned the terrorist attacks, the rhetoric of the terrorists made the party appear to belong in a 
“Communist family” album (Weinberg 1995:49).  
In a further move to carve a niche in the political landscape and move away from its 
association with communism, the PCI adopted “new internationalism,” advocating a more 




1986. The Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan was also condemned. The main motivational 
factors in the evolution of the PCI’s international choices were to gain closer ties with other left-
wing parties in Europe and to become an acceptable, legitimate partner in government (Daniels 
1987). In 1988, Achille Occhetto, the young reformist leader of the PCI, proposed radical 
changes for the party, called the new discourse. Occhetto focused on a new political agenda, 
emphasizing the role of women in Italy, environmental problems, and an expansion of 
democratic rights. Intra-party democracy was also strengthened, ending the idea of democratic 
centralism. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, Occhetto pushed for further changes and proposed 
to change the party’s name; a new party founded on the principles of democracy and human 
liberation was needed since the old conflict between capitalism and socialism became obsolete 
(Weinberg 1995). Finally in 1991, the PCI adopted a social democratic strategy and transformed 
itself into the Democratic Party of the Left (PDS). Sánchez-Cuenca claims that the fall of the 
Berlin Wall and the elimination of the Soviet constraint enabled full moderation of the PCI: 
“Moderation meant for the PCI ceasing to be communist; credibility was attained at the cost of 
renouncing its very identity” (1999, p. 23).  
In summary, PCI’s moderation was motivated by two sets of factors leading to two 
different kinds of moderation. International factors and constraints convinced the PCI of the need 
to relinquish the “militant liturgy” and adhere to procedural democracy in the 1940s. Such a 
limited moderation (tactical moderation) did not necessitate ideological compromise, while 
electoral democracy could be instrumentally valuable in reaching communism gradually instead 
of revolution. The PCI’s ideological change (ideological moderation) came only after the 1960s. 
The party renounced central tenets of its communist ideology, thereby enabling the PCI to 




moderation was largely driven by its reaction to unsuccessful revolutionary experiences in Italy 
and the rest of the world, and the international context; moderation was undertaken to ensure 
organizational survival. In contrast, it was largely societal changes in Italy that motivated PCI’s 
ideological moderation and eventual transformation into the PDS; international factors such as 
the fall of the Berlin Wall played a comparatively minor role in this process. In Table 2, I present 
a summary of PCI’s moderation along with that of the Moroccan PJD, which is discussed next.  
E. Party for Justice and Development (PJD) in Morocco 
Like the Italian PCI, the Moroccan Party for Justice and Development’s (PJD) experience with 
moderation also came in two distinct phases: tactical moderation between the 1980s and the 
1990s, and ideological moderation after 2000. Both types of moderation are discussed below. 
PJD’s origins lie in the Islamic Youth Association (Al-Shabiba), an Islamist organization 
established in 1969, which was largely influenced by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s 
prominent and highly controversial leader, Sayyid Qutb. During this period, the Islamic Youth 
Association viewed use of violence to establish an Islamic state as a legitimate tool, while 
participating in the political process was deemed to be against Islamic principles (Tlaidi 
interview, 2009; Shahin 1997, 182). In 1970s, King Hassan II banned the organization and 
persecuted many members within the group due to the Islamic Youth Association’s involvement 
in violent activities (Wegner and Pellicer 2009, 159).38  
In 1981, a new organization called Al-Jama’a Al-Islamiyya (the Islamic Group) was 
established by the younger leaders of the group. The new group emerged with revisions in 
organizational structure, ideology and practice. Unlike the Islamic Youth Association, Al-Jama’a 
Al-Islamiyya rejected the revolutionary ideology of Qutb and decided to participate in the 
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political system. The goal was to “push” the government to apply Islamic law gradually. Wegner 
and Pellicer note that Al-Jama’a’s goals during this period conform to classical Islamist 
discourse: “…To renew the understanding of religion, to advocate the implementation of sharia 
law, to achieve a comprehensive cultural renaissance, to work on accomplishing the unity of 
Muslims, to confront ideologies and ideas which they believed were subversive to Islam, and to 
raise the educational and moral level of the Moroccan people” (2009, 160).  
Al-Jama’a officially recognized “the political and religious legitimacy of the monarchic 
regime” while many members of the group still regarded participation in politics as un-Islamic 
(haram). The group published a report called “The Paper of Political Participation” to justify the 
political participation (Wegner and Pellicer 2009, 160). According to this report Al-Jama’a 
decided to participate in politics to reach a wider audience, to break the “siege of secularists” and 
to obtain parliamentary immunity to ensure the security of dawa (religious mission) activities 
(Tlaidi interview, 2009). In 1992, Al-Jama’a changed its name to Harakat al-Islah wal-Tajdid 
al-Maghribiyya (Moroccan Movement for Reform and Renewal) to reassert its commitment to 
the rules of the political game in Morocco (Shahin 1997, 191). Thus far, the trajectory of the 
Movement closely resembled that of the PCI. Initial extremism and rejection of electoral politics 
was followed by a phase of tactical moderation that entailed the recognition that revolutionary 
tactics were not serving the ideological goal well. Hence, to better serve dawa and to establish an 
Islamic state, the Movement opted for tactical moderation, i.e., changing its strategy without 
changing the core ideology.  
The Moroccan Movement for Reform and Renewal first proposed to establish a political 
party in 1992, but the government did not allow the Movement to form the party due to the 




sought to join an existing party’s legal umbrella and cooperation with Abdelkarim Al-Khatib’s 
moribund Constitutional and Democratic Popular Movement (MPDC) (Desrues and Moyano 
2001, 30). In 1997, the MPDC participated in legislative elections and won nine seats (Willis 
2004). In 1998, the party also changed its name to the Party for Justice and Development (PJD). 
However, neither the merger nor the name change greatly affected its Islamist ideology. While 
the PJD abandoned revolutionary ideas, it maintained the core Islamist ideology. Over the course 
of the next few years, the PJD underwent a substantial transformation, which resulted in 
ideological moderation. First, PJD’s platform evolved toward a moderate position, which 
emphasized pluralist democracy, liberal economy, and Muslim values. Second, the separation 
between the PJD and the Islamic movement that the party hailed from (Movement of Unity and 
Reform) facilitated further ideological moderation of the party. 
In 2002, PJD officials held internal discussions on the party’s future direction. As 
McFaul and Wittes (2008) note, electoral participation stimulated intraparty debates that are 
deemed to play a key role in PJD’s moderation. Bilal Tlaidi, a member of the PJD’s national 
council and a researcher on Islamic movements, stated that intra-party debates focused on party 
identity: was the PJD an Islamic party or a political party with an Islamic reference? Tlaidi noted 
the distinction as, “When you say an Islamic party, issues of Islamic identity and morals should 
be the main priority for the party. When you say a political party with an Islamic reference, that 
means the priority is public policy, but the solutions suggested by the PJD are based on Islamic 
values, not political Islam” (Tlaidi interview, 2009). After 2002, party programs clearly 
demonstrated that “public affairs” and problems around corruption and the economy took 




PJD officials attributed the ideological transformation of the party to societal changes. 
For example, former PJD leader Saad Eddin Uthmani emphasized such changes and stated, “It is 
impossible for societal changes not to change parties” (Uthmani interview, 2009). Similarly, 
Nezha El-Ouafi, a female legislator from the PJD, pointed out changes taking place both in 
Morocco and worldwide, and the concomitant necessity for the party to transform itself to “keep 
up” with the changes in their own constituency (El-Ouafi interview, 2009). The economic 
liberalization process that Morocco went through in the 1980s and 1990s led to new issues and 
demands in Morocco including economic development, democracy and social justice (Cohen 
2004; Cammett 2007). Interviews with party officials show that the party considered 
expectations from the public while formulating the new platform to echo the people’s “agenda” 
(El-Khalfi and Uthmani interviews, 2009).  
Specifically, the PJD party program shows a commitment to democracy (PJD Party 
Program 2007, 1-3), which Amara defined as “transparency, clean elections, human rights, and 
freedom of expression” (Amara interview, 2009). Critically, PJD officials likened the PJD to 
Christian democratic parties (El-Khalfi interview, 2009). The PJD assumes that Islamic/Muslim 
values represent the authentic identity of the party (and, of the Moroccan society) and therefore 
they should be upheld; yet, it does not go as far as calling for the imposition of an Islamic state 
on the society. Thus, the PJD was able to adopt a sincere democratic stance while keeping 
Muslim values. Islamist parties, by contrast, generally take on a stronger position on the role of 
Islam by calling for Islamic state and application of Islamic law, which prevents them from fully 
embracing democratic principles such as freedom of conscience and minority rights.39  
Economically, the PJD adopted a liberal discourse. Recognizing the “reality” of 
increasing economic globalization, the PJD called attention to Morocco’s “need” for greater 
                                                 




integration into global markets and its potential to benefit from it (Amara and El-Ouafi 
interviews, 2009). PJD legislator Lahcen Daoudi explained the “need” for Moroccan economic 
liberalization as follows: “In Morocco, economic opening is a necessity because we are a small 
state. It is not possible for us to develop with our domestic market only; we don’t have oil, 
minerals, or gold” (Daoudi interview, 2009). Complementing this statement, another PJD official 
argued that Moroccans are “benefiting” from economic liberalization, and hence the party favors 
a liberal economic policy (Bouanou interview, 2009). Though similar in emphasizing market 
economy, the PJD’s liberal economic stance differs from Islamist parties’ conventional pro-
market approach. Islamist parties ascribe a disproportionately large role for the state in managing 
the economy, whereas the PJD’s economic stance does not include the state’s management of the 
economy. Islamist parties’ vision of the state’s extensive role in regulating and supervising the 
economy goes beyond the liberal economic perspective that the PJD adopts. Overall, the new 
party mantra strives to capture the sentiment of its own constituency while attempting to be “a 
party of all Morocco”: Asalah, Adalah, Tanmiyah (Authenticity/Origins, Justice, Development) 
(El-Khalfi interview, 2009). 
In addition to socio-economic changes, organizational factors such as separation of the 
PJD from its founding organization, Movement for Unity and Reform (MUR), also fostered the 
ideological moderation process in late 1990s. The movement focused largely on “religious 
activities, education, culture, social welfare” whereas the party dealt with “the management of 
public affairs, political activities, and public policies.”40 The membership in the movement was 
not a formal condition for membership in the party which enabled the party to embrace ideas not 
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wholly endorsed by the movement. In 1997 elections all MPs except one were MUR members, 
whereas only 31% of PJD candidates up for a parliamentary seat were also MUR members in 
2002 elections.  Moreover, currently a lower percentage of intermediate-level and local-level 
officials in the party are also members of the MUR. The PJD set up its own “independent 
mobilization resources” accompanied by financial independence, institutionalization of party 
structure, and parallel structures (Wegner and Pellicer 2009). Overall, these changes show that 
the party was becoming increasingly independent of the movement. Thus, separation from the 
movement enabled the party to engage with a broader audience. Since the party did not represent 
Islam in its political platform—thanks to the movement-party separation—it had a relatively a 
greater opportunity to address the demands of a more diverse people.  
Crucially, the PJD began enjoying greater popular support in the post-2002 period 
following its ideological moderation. While the party won nine seats in the 1997 parliamentary 
elections, it received 13% and 11% of the votes in 2002 and 2007 elections, respectively, 
producing 42 and 46 parliamentary seats. The PJD won the plurality of seats (107 seats out of 
395) during the most recent parliamentary elections in 2011. PJD’s reach to a wider audience is 
analogous to PCI in Italy in the 1970s. The PJD aims to represent a broader constituency by 
moderating its policy platform, in response to perceived societal changes. The change in the 
constituency in the post-liberalization Morocco and the party’s willingness to separate the 
Islamic movement from the party support my argument. Hence, I conclude that PJD’s move to 
engage in ideological moderation in the post-2002 period is motivated by societal dynamics 






F. Application of the Theoretical Framework to Other Cases 
While the moderation by the PCI and PJD support the theoretical framework proposed in this 
chapter, such a limited analysis prevents drawing more general inferences. In this section, I 
briefly review the moderation of several other Islamist parties, examine various arguments 
proposed by scholars to explain moderation of these parties, and test the theory’s generalizability 
to other cases. While the cases reviewed here are far from being exhaustive, it presents a cross-
section of arguments explaining Islamist moderation. Below, I briefly review the moderation of 
the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the Wasat Party in Egypt, the Welfare Party, the Justice and 
Development Party, and the Felicity Party in Turkey, the Hamas, and the Islamic Action Front 
(IAF) in Jordan.  
The moderation process of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Egypt, one of the oldest and 
popular Islamist movements, started in 1980s (El-Ghobasy 2005). The MB experienced both 
tactical and ideological moderation throughout its history. The MB gradually moved away from 
Sayyid Qutb’s (1906-66) radical ideologies to a more moderate stance. The shift from 
“uncompromising” views of Sayyid Qutb to Hasan el Banna's moderate views and an emphasis 
on liberal democracy, an example of tactical moderation, occurred as a result of strategic 
calculations and participation in parliamentary elections in the 1980s (El-Ghobashy 2005; 
Harnisch and Mecham 2009; Schwedler 2007). Elections and working within the system are 
viewed as ways to spread their message (Islam is the solution); the MB participated in the system 
to spread the word of God (Abed-Kotob 1995; Harnisch and Mecham 2009).  The party also 
wanted to benefit from the increasing political openness of the new Mubarak regime (Harnisch 
and Mecham 2009). Pargeter (2010) argues that the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 and 




other hand, the MB’s ideological moderation, which is demonstrated by the adoption of a more 
“democratic” and “moderate” stance on various controversial issues such as women’s rights, 
parties and political pluralism, and the role of Egyptian Copts, occurred as a result of 
generational change− growing, better educated, young, pragmatic activists became dominant in 
the MB−, and learning institutional rules of participation (state repression) (El-Ghobashy 2005; 
Rurtherford 2006). The MB issued statements which emphasize women’s rights, party pluralism, 
and equal rights for the Christian Copts in 1994-95. The MB’s ideological moderation gained  
new momentum as a result of the passing of old, radical minded members in the 2000s (El-
Ghobashy 2005). However, whether MB’s ideological transformation is complete or not and 
whether their commitment to democracy is sincere or not, are debatable questions (El-Ghobashy 
2005; Masoud 2008; Pargeter 2010). The MB claims a commitment to liberal progressive ideas 
while keeping references to Sheria law, which creates contradictions (Pargeter 2010). After the 
2011 Arab Spring and toppling of Mubarek, The MB won the first free elections and came to 
power in 2012. While the movement assures that their goal is “participation, not domination,” 
President Mohamed Morsi’s recent decision to grant himself extraordinary powers increased 
doubts about the movements’ commitment to liberal democracy (Masoud 2012). Tadros (2012) 
argues that the Muslim Brotherhood is a pragmatic movement that has changed as a result of 
changing political circumstances but the MB has a highly conservative ideology. To sum up, 
some refer to the Muslim Brotherhood's transformation as involving extensive ideological 
moderation (El-Ghobashy 2005; Rutherford 2006) whereas others view it merely as a tactical 
maneuver to gradually establish an Islamic state (Abed-Kotob 1995; Schwedler 2007; Harnisch 




The Wasat Party, which split from the MB and formed in 1996, also took the path of 
ideological moderation and altered positions on certain controversial issues such as the inclusion 
of women in parliament, and advocacy of equal rights for Egyptian Copts (Stacher 2002; 
Wickham 2004). The Wasat Party’s ideological moderation was largely driven by strategic 
calculations, social learning, and intra-party debates. The core beliefs and values of leaders 
changed as a result of interaction with seculars and cross-ideological cooperation (Clark 2006; 
Wickham 2004). Moreover, fear of repression, demand to seize new political opportunities and 
avoid constraints with the autocratic elite also contributed to the ideological moderation of the 
party (Wickham 2004). Wickham argues that strategic moderation leads to changes in the public 
rhetoric and behavior of actors which can eventually cause change in ultimate goals. In other 
words, “The mask becomes the face” (Hoeber 2003, as cited in Wickham 2004, 225).  
The Justice and Development Party of Turkey (JDP) engaged in ideological moderation 
whereas the Welfare Party (WP), and the Felicity Party (FP) experienced only tactical 
moderation. Both the JDP and the FP are offshoots of the Welfare Party which was closed by the 
Constitutional Court after the 1998 postmodern military coup. Turkish politics is characterized 
by a power struggle between the secular elite (represented by the Constitutional Court, the 
military and leftist parties) and religious parties. Islamic parties were banned from politics 
several times by the Constitutional Court since they are regarded as a threat to secular 
democracy. 
The WP gained a plurality of votes and came to power in the 1996 elections. Survival 
concerns and the realization of institutional constraints, such as the fear of closure by the 
Constitutional court, motivated the tactical moderation of both the WP and the FP (Mecham 




system party; the election campaigns emphasized creation of an interest-free Islamic economy, 
anti-Western sentiments, and religious freedom (Mecham 2004, 342). When the WP came to 
power, Erbakan, the leader of the party, visited Islamist states such as Iran and Libya in order to 
establish an economic bloc of Muslim countries. Erbakan also invited religious leaders to the 
prime minister’s residence which led to criticism by the secular elite and the eventual closure of 
the party (Mecham 2004). The members of the WP established the Virtue Party after the closure 
of the WP. Meanwhile, there were intra-party debates and a power struggle between the 
reformist young generation and old members who were loyal to Erbakan. The Virtue party was 
also eventually closed by the Constitutional Court in 2001 since it was regarded as continuation 
of the WP. Then, two splinter parties established: reformists and more pragmatists established 
the JDP and those loyal to Erbakan formed the Felicity Party. The JDP came to power in the 
2002 elections and focused on legislative and constitutional reforms that promote democracy, 
market economy, and pro-EU reforms while avoiding religious references. Institutional 
constraints−political learning from past experiences−, generational change−existence of young, 
reformist leaders−, socio-economic changes,   and electoral incentives−the recognition that 
majority votes for centrist parties−motivated the ideological moderation of the JDP (Mecham 
2004; Ozbudun 2006; Tezcur 2010; Yilmaz 2009) On the other hand, even though the FP faced 
similar institutional constraints with the JDP, its religious ideology remained intact. Tezcur 
(2010) argues that the unresponsiveness of the FP to institutional constraints was because of the 
lack of reform-minded leaders. The leaders of the FP kept a rigid Islamist ideology which 
prevented their full moderation.  
Hamas is another influential Islamist group that went through tactical moderation for a 




spoiler during the Palestinian-Israel peace process in 1990s. However, Hamas changed its 
strategy by declaring a unilateral ceasefire towards Israel in 2003 and participating in elections in 
2005-2006. Hamas also changed uncompromising views regarding the borders of the future 
Palestinian state and accepted pre-1967 borders. Hovdenak (2009) argues that international 
pressure and demand for recognition led to the moderation of Hamas. However, 
unresponsiveness of international actors to Hamas’s compromises and the boycott of the Hamas 
government after the 2006 elections weakened moderate leaders within Hamas. As a result, 
Hamas re-radicalized and violently took over the Gaza Strip in 2007 (Hovdenak 2009). The 
international constraints played a significant role during both the moderation and re-
radicalization process of Hamas. In other words, international actors’ unwillingness to reward the 
tactical moderation of the Hamas back-fired the moderation process.   
Finally, the Islamic Action Front (IAF) in Jordan experienced tactical and arguably 
ideological moderation to a certain extent. The IAF’s ideological platform emphasizes 
implementation of sharia, denouncing corruption, liberation of Palestine, women’s equality 
within an Islamic framework, freedom and democracy. The leaders of IAF claim that the party 
believes in democracy, not as a tactic but as a strategy. The goal is Islamization of society, 
gradually and democratically. Robinson (1997) explains the IAF’s embracement of democracy 
(tactical moderation) with strategic reasons; mainly to protect organizational and political 
interests and to secure survival of the party in a repressive regime. The IAF played by the rules 
of the game even though the King adopted a new electoral law (1993) which limited the IAF’s 
chances of gaining seats in the parliament. The King also signed a peace treaty with Israel (1994) 
which was highly criticized by the IAF. Nevertheless, the IAF did not resort to violence. The 




that the IAF moderated both behaviorally (what I call tactical moderation) and to some extent 
ideologically. According to Schwedler (2006; 2007), political inclusion leads to cooperation with 
other parties (and hence tactical moderation) but inclusion alone is insufficient for ideological 
moderation; internal party debates within the party and Islamic justification of new 
practices−cooperation with other parties and participation− produced ideological moderation of 
IAF.  
To sum up, two observations stand out from the review of these moderation cases. First, 
with two notable exceptions (the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and the Jordanian Islamic 
Action Front for which both tactical and ideological moderation explanations exist in the 
literature), the distinction between tactical and ideological moderation largely correlates with 
how Islamist moderation is conceptualized as a dependent variable. Cases of tactical moderation 
and how they are operationalized contrasts sharply with cases of ideological moderation. While 
factors like renunciation of violence, use of electoral politics, and cross-ideological cooperation 
are offered as observable implications of tactical moderation, ideological moderation is marked 
by the moderation of Islamist ideology on democratic values, pluralism, women’s rights, market 
economy, and adoption of more centrist positions.   
Second, regarding the causes of moderation, there is some level of convergence, although 
the convergence is to a lesser extent than the one observed for types of Islamist moderation. 
Among the causes of tactical moderation mentioned in the literature are inclusion, international 
pressure, political liberalization, internal debates, and organizational survival/interest. By 
contrast, factors leading to ideological moderation are less coherent: institutional constraints, 
rules of participation, generational differences, social learning, internal conflict, participation, 




fact, reminiscent of factors leading to tactical moderation. The incongruence between the 
theoretical framework proposed in this chapter and the factors assumed to lead to ideological 
moderation is partly related to the way ideological moderation is conceptualized as ideological 
change. As discussed above, there exists a certain level of disagreement as to whether certain 
groups actually went through a process of ideological transformation or not. Overall, the 
theoretical framework largely captures the variation in Islamist moderation in a cross-national 
setting. Nonetheless, a more rigorous test of the theory is necessary to confirm the preliminary 
findings in this analysis. 
G. Conclusion 
 
Moderation has been both a key term in popular discourse and an important research question in 
the scholarly literature recently. In this chapter, I reviewed the Islamist moderation literature and 
demonstrated that the literature thus far failed to produce a systematic approach to analyze 
Islamist moderation. Specifically, I showed that moderation stands for a wide array of ideas 
ranging from limited attitudinal self-restraint (or, being tolerant) to far-reaching ideological 
renunciation and democratization. Moreover, there is no consensus among scholars about the 
underlying causes of moderation; a number of competing arguments are provided to explain 
moderation of Islamist parties. My goal in this chapter was to introduce a preliminary framework 
to examine Islamist moderation in a systematic fashion across a wide range of contexts. To this 
end, I examined the literature on Communist parties’ moderation in Western Europe. Because 
Communist parties went through different waves of moderation throughout the 20th century just 
as Islamist parties have been going through in recent years, the case of Communist parties and 




 I identified two kinds of moderation: tactical and ideological. Tactical moderation refers 
to a limited kind of moderation in which radical parties renounce use of violence but the anti-
system ideology remains largely intact, and democracy is instrumental in achieving the 
ideological goal. Ideological moderation, in contrast, refers to an extensive effort in abandoning 
major elements of the anti-system ideology on issues such as the Islamic state, economy and 
pluralist democracy. Building on this framework, I presented several case studies. The first one 
was the moderation of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) until the 1990s. The second case study 
was that of the Moroccan Party for Justice and Development (PJD) from its origins in the 1970s 
until the early 2000s. Both cases served to demonstrate the theoretical framework developed in 
this chapter.  
The moderation processes of the PJD and the PCI indicate that similar paths of 
moderation occur as a result of similar causal factors. The PCI’s decision to adopt the Popular 
Front strategy and to leave the revolutionary path was largely due to the international context, 
namely, the failure of revolutionary strategies in other parts of the world. On the other hand, the 
PJD decided to participate in the political system and recognized the political and religious 
legitimacy of the monarchic regime since the more radical form of the group was banned. In both 
cases, the fear of repression and the failure of non-democratic alternatives were the driving force 
for tactical moderation. Neither the PCI nor the PJD sacrificed ideological principles while 
participating in the political system and maintaining the end-goals of communism and Islamic 
state at this stage. Socioeconomic changes in the 1950s and the 1960s due to rapid economic 
growth in Italy and the economic liberalization process throughout the 1990s in Morocco 




the moderation process of other Islamist parties provides partial support for the theoretical 
framework developed in this chapter.  
The findings of previous chapters indicate that religious ideology and/or Islam is not a 
significant factor in driving conflicts and decision to resort to violence in the Muslim world; 
other socio-economic factors and political opportunities/ constraints largely shape the likelihood 
of eruption of domestic conflicts. The findings of this chapter are in line with previous findings. 
Like radicalization and violence, moderation is significantly influenced by socio-economic 
factors as well as international constraints. Ideologies and ideas change over time. Even though 
some Islamist parties initially moderate for strategic purposes and survival concerns, changing 
electoral dynamics push for further ideological moderation. Thus, one can conclude that 
political parties even with rigid radical ideologies may not resist societal changes and hence 
gradually moderate. Finally, the similarities between moderation of Communist parties and 
Islamist parties suggest that there is no “Islamic exceptionalism”. Radical Islamist parties are 
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 Appendix 1: List of Tables 
Table 4.1: Arguments on Islamist Moderation in the Literature 
 Independent variable Type of moderation Definition of 
moderation 
Schwedler (2006) Inclusion Participate in 
democratic processes 
“Movement from a 
relatively closed and 
rigid worldview to one 
more open and tolerant 
of alternative 
perspectives” 
Wickham (2004) Inclusion & social 
learning 
Ideological moderation Ideological moderation 
and respect for the 
democratic processes 












Clark (2006)  1) Spirit of 
compromise, 2) more 
than a mere “tactical” 











Endorsing democracy Democracy 
Wegner and 
Pellicer (2009) 
Party autonomy 1) Level of 
disagreement between 
party and Islamic social 
movement, and 2) level 
of cooperation with 
other (left) parties 
“Increasing flexibility 
towards core ideological 
beliefs”  
Somer (2007) 





Moving away from 
extremism 
Zakaria (2004) 
Economic liberalization Ideological moderation 
 
 
Table 4.2: Summary of Cases 
 Italian Communist Party (PCI) Party for Justice and Development (PJD) 
Pre-
moderation 
- Marxist/Leninist ideology 
- Armed struggle 
- Socialist revolution 
- Moroccan society in jahiliyya (pre-Islamic ignorance) 
- Use of force legitimate 
- Political participation un-Islamic 








- Risks associated 
with extremism 
- Defeat of 
communist guerilla 




- Democracy as a 
means 
- Limited ideological 
change 







- To break 
“secularist” siege 
- To obtain 
parliamentary 
immunity to ensure 
security of dawa 
activities 
- Desire to reach a 
wider audience 
- Break with Qutb’s 
extremist ideas 
(Moroccan society is 
not jahili) 
- Use of force not 
acceptable 
- Reach Islamic state 
and Islamic law 
gradually 
- Accept rules of 
electoral game in 
Morocco 






- 1964 Yalta 
Memorandum 
- 1968 Soviet 
invasion of 
Czechoslovakia 
- Disassociation from 
the S.U.  
- Break with Leninist 
ideology 
- Uncertain democratic 
commitment 
- Conflicting views 






& party name 
changed to 
Democratic 





by the sustained 
post-war economic 
growth 
- Weakening social 
base 
- 1/3 of membership 
lost 
- Support for Christian 
Democratic 
governments 
- Accept NATO and 
European integration 






party identity & 
direction (2002)& 
separation of the 
movement and the 
party 
- Socioeconomic 




- To appeal to a 
wider audience 




- Support for liberal 
economy and 
globalization 
- Emphasis on Islamic 
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Mustapha El-Khalfi – PJD official and editor of Al-Tajdid newspaper; Rabat, December 8, 
2009. 
Saad Eddin Uthmani – Former secretary general, PJD; Rabat, December 8, 2009. 
Dr. Driss Bouanou – Youth leader and member of Committee on Foreign Relations, PJD; 
Rabat, December 10, 2009. 
Abdulkadir Amara – PJD parliamentarian and member of the PJD General Secretariat; Rabat 
December 17, 2009. 
Bilal Tlaidi – PJD National Council member, independent researcher, and reporter for Al-Tajdid 
newspaper; Rabat, December 17, 2009. 
Lahcen Daoudi – PJD parliamentarian; Rabat, December 18, 2009. 
Nezha El-Ouafi – PJD parliamentarian and academician; Rabat, December 23, 2009. 












































The recent uprisings and the ongoing violent/nonviolent protests in the Middle East once again 
led to popular debates about what drives conflict in the Muslim world. There are a number of 
competing arguments that explain driving forces of violence in the Muslim world, radicalization, 
de-radicalization, and moderation of Islamist parties/groups. These explanations focus on a 
variety of factors such as socio-economic and demographic factors, religion, culture, political 
opportunities, and constraints. Specifically, there is a theoretical debate about whether Islam 
fosters violence or not. Yet, there is no consensus among scholars about the extent to which 
religion may promote political violence.  
This dissertation investigates the empirical nexus between Islam and political 
violence/nonviolence by specifically focusing on the incidence of domestic armed conflict, 
group-level political violence (such as insurgency, terrorism, and genocide), and party 
moderation. In chapter 2, I examine factors that increase a country’s risk of experiencing 
domestic armed conflict, whereas chapter 3 analyzes conditions under which ethno-political 
organizations opt for violent strategies to achieve their goals. Chapter 4 examines moderation of 
Islamist parties.  
I argue that religious denomination alone does not necessarily make countries more or 
less conflict-prone. Socio-economic and political conditions usually determine the decision to 
resort to violence or alternatively to renounce violence and to moderate. While numerous 
conflicts in the world may be framed as religious, ignoring root causes of violence and solely 
attributing conflict-proneness to cultural or ideological factors would be an oversimplification 
of these complex events. Indeed, existing studies that conclude that Muslim-majority countries 
are more conflict/violence-prone fail to control for factors that increase the risk of insurgency, 
such as socio-economic development, state repression, youth bulges, and oil dependence, and 
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confound many variables under “Islam”. It is not possible to draw a causal relationship between 
Islam and conflict-proneness without controlling for factors that increase the risk of domestic 
conflict. Below, I review the general findings from the preceding analysis of this dissertation. 
First, I compare and contrast findings of chapter 2 and chapter 3, and organize my findings 
based on key concepts tested in both chapters: religion, demographic factors, grievances, 
political opportunity structure, and resources. I also suggest potential explanations for some of 
the null findings, and provide suggestions for future research.  Next, I summarize the findings 
from chapter 4, which focus on Islamist party moderation. Finally, I conclude by discussing the 
policy implications of my overall findings.  
Religion 
What explains the prevalence of political violence in the Muslim world and to what 
extent does religion play a role in promoting violence? These research questions motivated my 
dissertation. I conducted a number of empirical analyses to evaluate the impact of religion in 
fostering violence at both state-level and group-level. The overall findings indicate that, 
contrary to suggestions and claims in the literature, neither religious fractionalization nor Islam 
promotes conflict once socio-economic and political factors are taken into account. 
  First, religious fractionalization is negative and insignificant in all of the regressions in 
chapter 2, which suggests that religious diversity is not a significant factor in inciting domestic 
armed conflict. Second, intra-state conflicts are indeed more prevalent in Muslim-plurality 
states, but social, economic, and political conditions in these states create an environment that is 
very susceptible to domestic armed conflicts. Muslim-plurality states are characterized by more 
repressive regimes, oil dependent economies, more poverty, and a higher proportion of youth 
bulges. While Islam appears to be significantly correlated to domestic armed conflict onset in a 
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bivariate regression, the significance of Islam disappears once the correlates of domestic armed 
conflict are controlled for.  Both Muslim-plurality and interactions of Muslim-plurality with 
various explanatory variables remain insignificant in most of the regressions even after trying 
different operationalization of Islam –use of Muslim-plurality, Muslim-majority or Muslim 
proportion−, and alternative model specifications. Third, the findings from chapter 3 also 
confirm that Islamist ideology is not a significant factor in driving violence at the group level. 
Even though the limitation of the analyses to Middle Eastern region prevents making broad 
generalizations and comparing conflict-proneness of organizations in Muslim countries with 
non-Muslim ones, not all of the ethno-political organizations in the Middle East are inspired by 
religious/Islamist ideology. Thus, I was able to control for the influence of religion by 
comparing the conflict-proneness of organizations that have a religious/Islamist ideology with 
non-religious ones. Like the Muslim-plurality variable in the previous chapter, Islamist ideology 
is insignificant in all of the models in chapter 3.  
Demographic Factors 
The demographic structure of a country has the potential to increase the risk of domestic 
armed conflict and group-level violence. Specifically, increasing population growth and the 
existence of large youth cohorts make countries more prone to conflict/violence. The countries 
that have a higher total population are expected to be more prone to domestic armed conflict 
since it is hard to control people and deter insurgency in highly populated countries. Increasing 
population may also lead to resource scarcity, higher unemployment rates, and poverty. 
Moreover, the existence of a youth bulge− which is defined as the proportion of young males 
between the ages of 15-24 to total adult population− increases both grievances (especially when 
coupled with poverty, unemployment, and repressive regimes) and the supply of potential rebel 
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recruits (Urdal 2006). For example, some scholars argue that youth bulges have played a 
significant role during the recent uprisings in the Middle East; it is argued that those young 
people, dissatisfied with their oppressive regimes and frustrated with unemployment, rebelled 
against their governments (Hoffman and Jamal 2012; Mohammed 2011). 
The findings from chapter 2 suggest that total population indeed increases the risk of 
domestic armed conflict, whereas the impact of youth bulge is inconclusive. While youth bulge 
is insignificant in most of the regressions, the Islam-youth bulge interaction in Model 8 is 
positive and significant, suggesting that Muslim-plurality countries with a higher proportion of 
young males are more conflict-prone than the rest of the sample. However, further analysis from 
the marginal effect of youth bulge suggests that Muslim-plurality states become more conflict-
prone than non-Muslim countries for only extremely high values of youth bulges. While the 
impact of youth bulge in chapter 2 is puzzling, the findings from chapter 3 indicate that youth 
bulges significantly increase the probability of violence by ethno-political organizations. Youth 
bulge is positive and significant in all of the models in Chapter 3. I also interact youth bulge 
with several explanatory variables in chapter 3 to explore whether the positive influence of 
youth bulges is conditional on other socio-economic or political factors. I find that the youth 
bulges- autocracy interaction is positive and significant, whereas youth-democracy, youth-
repression, youth-economic grievance, and youth-Islamist ideology interactions are all 
insignificant. Obviously, youth bulges create more problems in autocratic countries than 
democratic ones.  
Future studies may focus on exploring the role of youth bulges in increasing the risk of 
domestic armed conflict in the Muslim world. What makes these youth population more prone 
to the use of violence and why are they more conflict-prone than other age cohorts? This is an 
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important research question which remains underexplored. Grievances that stem from 
unfavorable socio-economic and political conditions, such as high unemployment rate, high 
income inequality, and the existence of oppressive/ authoritarian regimes, may be mediating 
between the use of violence and youth bulges. Future research can test the conditional impact of 
youth bulges by interacting youth bulge with unemployment rate, education, or income 
inequality. Currently, I control for GDP per capita, regime type, and repression but existing data 
on education, income inequality, and unemployment have many missing observations.  
Grievances  
 How significant are grievances in fostering violence and domestic armed conflict? 
According to Gurr (1970)’s relative deprivation theory, social, economic, and political 
grievances lead to feelings of relative deprivation and frustration, which in turn motivates 
individuals to resort to violence. Yet, there is no solid empirical support for the relative 
deprivation hypothesis; existing studies provide mixed evidence regarding the impact of 
grievances in fostering violence (Canetti et al 2010; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Fearon and 
Laitin 2003; Gurr 1993; Mousseau 2011; Regan 2009). I examine the impact of economic, 
political, and cultural grievances in fostering domestic armed conflict and group-level violence 
in chapters 2 and 3, respectively. 
 In chapter 2, I use GDP per capita to operationalize economic grievances. Higher values 
of GDP per capita indicate more economic development and hence fewer grievances. I rely on 
GDP per capita, which is a very crude proxy of economic grievances, due to limitations in data 
availability of better indicators at the cross-national level. Even though there is a negative 
relationship between GDP per capita and likelihood of domestic armed conflict, it reaches 
statistical significance in only Models 5 and 8.  GDP per capita loses statistical significance 
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when oil dependence is added to the model. Oil dependence is known to increase risk of 
domestic armed conflict. Perhaps, oil-rich countries with high GDP per capitas are still prone to 
conflict. In other words, the negative impact of GDP per capita may be overwhelmed by the 
positive influence of oil dependence in promoting domestic conflict. Political and cultural 
grievances are not tested in chapter 2 since there is no cross-national data available to measure 
these concepts. 
In chapter 3, I use three ordinal variables from the MAROB organizational behavior data 
to test the impact of economic, political, and cultural grievances in promoting violence at the 
group-level. Unlike the previous chapter, the findings from chapter 3 suggest that economic 
grievances significantly increase the probability of adopting violent strategies by ethno-political 
organizations, whereas neither political grievances nor cultural grievances have any significant 
impact. However, caution is necessary when interpreting the insignificance of political 
grievances. All of the ethno-political organizations in the MAROB dataset have political 
grievances, which prevents controlling for the impact of this concept since there is little 
variation in this explanatory variable. I only compared conflict-proneness of separationist 
groups/ independence movements to those that have a less severe political grievance and the 
difference between the two was not statistically significant. In sum, even though grievances 
seem to increase the risk of violence, the findings from both chapters remain inconclusive. 
Future research can explore the conditional effect of grievances− such as interacting economic 
grievances with youth bulges – and use better indicators of socio-economic grievances such as 





Political Opportunity Structure 
Political opportunities and constraints available in a society significantly influence the 
decision to resort to violence. If political institutions give people the opportunity to express their 
dissatisfaction/frustration through nonviolent/conventional means, the likelihood of violence 
and conflict declines since rational individuals would prefer nonviolent options, which are less 
risky and proven to be more successful, compared to violent ones (Stephan and Chenoweth 
2008). In other words, to rebel, deprived groups should believe that violent action is the only 
option. Therefore, political opportunities play a significant role in transforming grievances into 
militant action. While exclusive and repressive regimes promote violence, inclusive regimes 
decrease the probability of use of violence (Hafez 2003). 
State repression and regime type are used in both chapters to test the impact of political 
opportunities/constraints in fostering violence. Repression is a double edged sword; repression 
can deter rebellion by increasing the cost of collective action, but it can also increase risk of 
conflict through increasing grievances. In chapter 2, I use the CIRI integrity score to test the 
impact of repression. Repression was positive and significant, whereas its squared term was 
negative and significant in most of the models. Low levels of repression increase the risk of 
domestic armed conflict, whereas high levels of repression actually decrease the risk of conflict, 
since collective action becomes very costly under extremely repressive regimes. The findings 
from chapter 3 confirm that repression in general fosters violence; ethno-political organizations 
that are repressed by the state are more likely to use violent strategies than other organizations.  
The literature on domestic armed conflict onset suggests that there is a curvilinear 
relationship between regime type and likelihood of domestic armed conflict; transitionary 
regimes are expected to be more prone to domestic armed conflicts than both democracies and 
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autocracies since transitionary regimes usually lack the capacity to deter insurgency as well as 
the nonviolent means to express frustration. I use the Polity score from the Polity IV project and 
create a dichotomous variable for anocracies to examine the impact of regime type in chapter 2. 
The empirical analysis confirms that transitionary regimes are indeed more conflict prone; an 
anocracy dummy is positive and significant in three of the five models and barely loses 
significance in the remaining two models. However, unlike theoretical expectations, the 
findings from chapter 3 suggest that regime type does not seem to affect the decision to resort to 
violence by ethno-political organizations. I use a dichotomous variable for democracies and it 
was insignificant in all of the regressions. Alternatively, I include the polity score and its 
squared term in the analysis and it was also insignificant. 41  One potential reason for 
insignificance of regime type at the group-level analysis could be selection bias; the dataset 
includes only Middle Eastern countries. Most Middle Eastern countries are non-democratic; 
there is little variation in regime type among Middle Eastern countries. Israel is the only country 
which is coded as ‘free’ by Freedom House and Israel has a long history of conflict with 
Palestinians, which makes it a democratic but violence-prone nation. Future studies may 
examine more countries, and test the impact of regime type in fostering violence by ethno-
political organizations.  
Resources 
Resource mobilization theory emphasizes the importance of resources required to 
mobilize rather than grievances in promoting rebellion. It is argued that frustration is not 
sufficient for mobilization; groups need resources to transfer individual frustration into group 
mobilization. Therefore, both external and internal resources affect mobilization capacity and 
the probability of rebellion (McCarthy and Zald 1977). At the state level, the existence of oil or 
                                                 
41 The models with a continuous polity score are not reported here, but they are available upon request.  
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other natural resources are expected to increase the risk of domestic armed conflict.  Ross (2006) 
claims that oil and other minerals increase the risk of conflict because they make independence 
more desirable for resource-rich regions. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) confirm that the existence 
of natural resources creates opportunities to rebel. However, oil money can also be used to co-
opt potential dissidents, especially in politically corrupt regimes, thus reducing the risk of 
domestic conflict (Fjelde 2009). At the group-level, external support for an organization from 
diasporas or from other international actors and domestic support generally determine available 
resources to mobilize and capability to engage in collective action.  
I control for both oil-dependence and natural resource-dependence in chapter 2 and find 
that countries that have a higher proportion of oil rents as well as other natural resource rents are 
at greater risk of experiencing domestic armed conflict. In chapter 3, I include two dichotomous 
variables from the MAROB data that measure internal and external support for the organization 
to proxy resources available to ethno-political organizations. While external support increases 
the probability of violence by these organizations, domestic support for the organizations does 
not have a significant impact. Overall, these findings indicate that resources are indeed crucial 
in promoting political violence.  
 In sum, the findings from chapter 2 and chapter 3 suggest that state repression, regime 
type, availability of resources, youth bulges, and grievances all affect the likelihood of domestic 
armed conflict as well as the decision to resort to violence by ethno-political organizations. 
While state repression, economic grievances, and resources are found to be significant in both 
chapters, the impact of other factors varies depending on the level of analysis.  There is a 
curvilinear relationship between regime type and the risk of domestic armed conflict at the 
state-level of analysis, whereas regime type fails to reach statistical significance when the 
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analysis is conducted at the group-level. On the contrary, youth bulge is positive and 
statistically significant in all of the Models in chapter 3, whereas it is insignificant in most of the 
Models in chapter 2. Finally, religion fails to reach significance in all of the regressions in both 
chapters. One can conclude that socio-economic and political conditions rather than religion 
largely determine the decision to resort to violence.  
Moderation of Islamist Parties 
In chapter 4, I analyze the moderation of Islamist parties, which has been a common 
trend for many Islamist parties.  By building on the findings of the Communist moderation 
literature, I introduce a two-stage framework to explain variation in Islamist moderation: tactical 
vs. ideological moderation. Tactical moderation occurs when radical parties renounce the use of 
violence and decide to accept electoral democracy as a means to achieve political goals without 
compromising their core ideology. Structural factors such as political liberalization, 
international factors such as failure of revolutionary tactics in other parts of the world, and state 
repression drive tactical moderation of radical parties. Some parties go beyond the tactical 
moderation and change their ideological positions on democracy, the economic system, and the 
political role of Islam, which I call Ideological moderation. Ideological moderation is largely 
driven by electoral motives. In other words, Islamist parties moderate their radical ideologies as 
a response to societal changes such as economic liberalization, economic growth, generational 
changes, electoral loss, and changing voter preferences to gain greater popular support. 
Empirically, the Italian Communist Party (PCI) and the Party for Justice and 
Development (PJD) in Morocco are analyzed in comparative perspective. PCI’s tactical 
moderation was largely driven by its reaction to unsuccessful revolutionary experiences in Italy 
and the rest of the world, and the international context; moderation was undertaken to ensure 
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organizational survival. Likewise, the Party for Justice and Development in Morocco opted for 
tactical moderation in order to better serve dawa (religious mission) activities and to establish 
an Islamic state. In both cases, the fear of repression and the failure of non-democratic 
alternatives were the driving forces for tactical moderation. On the other hand, societal changes 
and electoral dynamics in Italy led to the ideological moderation of the PCI. Similarly, electoral 
participation, intraparty debates, societal changes, and organizational factors such as separation 
of the PJD from its founding organization fostered the ideological moderation process.   
Policy Implications 
The research questions explored in this dissertation are relevant for both scholars and 
policy makers. The findings of this research can help policy makers in developing strategies that 
will reduce the threat of religious extremism and domestic armed conflict. I did explore the role 
of religion and Islamist ideology in driving domestic armed conflict or lower level violence in 
the first two quantitative chapters whereas the qualitative chapter focused on Islamist party 
moderation. The overall findings indicate that religion by itself does not drive conflict; 
unfavorable socio-economic and political conditions explain the high hazard of domestic 
conflict in the Muslim world. This is good news for policy makers; it is possible to contain or 
decrease these domestic conflicts by implementing policies that will alleviate some of the social, 
economic, and political problems. Hypothetically, there would be little one can do to eliminate 
these conflicts if religion was the major cause since religious preference can hardly change.  
Among all of the socio-economic and political factors analyzed in this dissertation, state 
repression is found to be significant in all of the regressions as well as in the qualitative analysis. 
While repression has the potential to deter insurgency, to foster insurgency, to motivate 
radicalization or moderation of Islamist parties, the overall findings suggest that repression 
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usually breeds more violence. Therefore, policy makers should reconsider the use of repressive 
measures to deter opposition groups. While spreading democracies may decrease the probability 
of conflict in the long run, transition periods are usually characterized with more violence and 
higher rates of domestic armed conflict. Even though the analysis is limited to the Middle East, 
the findings from chapter 3 suggest that regime type does not affect ethno-political 
organizations’ decision to resort to violence. Perhaps, it is repressiveness of the regime rather 
than its autocratic nature that fosters violence. Arguably, even democratic countries could be 
repressive to a certain extent.  
Finally, understanding the evolution of radical Islamist parties (the moderation process) 
is necessary for better policymaking in the Middle East. Islamist parties are key political actors, 
which are regarded as the only viable opposition group in many Muslim countries. Islamist 
parties won the most recent elections in Turkey, Egypt, Tunisia, and in Morocco. Whether 
Islamist parties moderate or not—or, to what extent they moderate—may shape the course of 
transitions in the region. The preceding analysis suggests that Islamist parties act strategically 
and respond to societal changes. Participation in the political system fosters moderation and de-
radicalization whereas exclusive and repressive policies lead to radicalization and violence. 
Therefore, developing policies that encourage Islamist parties’ political participation may help 
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